Norwegian Armed Forces in transition

STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW BY
THE NORWEGIAN CHIEF OF DEFENCE
ABRIDGED VERSION
In the course of 2014 the security situation in Europe changed, bringing once again to the fore the need to prioritise the defence of Norway and its allies against aggressive actions or attack.

In her letter requesting a review, the Minister of Defence asked me to provide recommendations based on a compensated, 2015-level budget. I was also to indicate priorities on a budget beyond 0.5 per cent annual growth, and this forms the basis for my recommendations.

The recommended force structure will not cost more than continuing with the existing structure. I recommend phasing in or strengthening certain capabilities, while de-prioritising some and phasing out others, to achieve a reasonably sized yet suitable first line of defence of Norway. However, both the agreed-on structure and the recommended first line of defence entail a markedly higher cost than the current budget allows, even when implementing the proposed efficiency-raising measures that represented NOK 22 billion in savings over a 20-year period.

This Strategic Defence Review emphasises making use of the defence sector’s competencies. Armed Forces specialist circles and planning staffs have provided input and analysis, and the employees’ organisations have been involved along the way and in related discussions. I wish to commend the employees for their thorough assessments and constructive input that have helped to shape the final review document.

The Armed Forces’ primary missions in relation to the Armed Forces. It is unrealistic to base defence planning on an assumption of lengthy warning times before crises occur in the areas adjacent to Norway. It is necessary to assess the implications of the increased need for readiness and to seek ways of heightening the ready status of the Armed Forces. Logistics and material readiness and civil-sector support in times of crisis or war must also be assessed.

This review is to identify potential deviations within various financial trajectories, including a compensated, 2015-level budget and a budget with 0.5 per cent real annual growth. Additionally, the Chief of Defence is asked to provide his prioritisation if the Armed Forces are given resources beyond a budget of 0.5 per cent real annual growth.

The Armed Forces are to identify necessary measures within their structure, personnel and competencies, operations and investments. Measures must include coordination with other agencies in the Armed Forces sector to ensure implementation of future-oriented, cost-effective schemes. In this input, the Chief of Defence is to give special weight to recommendations relating to military establishments and support structure and the management and staff structure.

The Armed Forces are to be identified with Norway’s allies and assist in Allied crisis-management operations.

The Armed Forces are to continue in and certain areas boost their investments in new technologies that facilitate new and more effective ways to complete missions. This applies in particular to surveillance and intelligence in Norwegian spheres of interest, but also in areas such as firepower and protection.

The Armed Forces are to identify necessary measures within their structure, personnel and competencies, operations and investments. Measures must include coordination with other agencies in the Armed Forces sector to ensure implementation of future-oriented, cost-effective schemes. In this input, the Chief of Defence is to give special weight to recommendations relating to military establishments and support structure and the management and staff structure.

The current security situation calls for a review of the state of preparedness within the Armed Forces. It is unrealistic to base defence planning on an assumption of lengthy warning time before crises occur in the areas adjacent to Norway. It is necessary to assess the implications of the increased need for readiness and to seek ways of heightening the ready status of the Armed Forces. Logistics and material readiness and civil-sector support in times of crisis or war must also be assessed.

Among our allies, there is increasing awareness of the need for more and better-integrated multinational solutions. There is a need for military assessments of how to realise the full potential of multinational solutions while at the same time strengthening existing cooperation with our allies and partners.

The Chief of Defence is to assess how to target the Armed Forces’ capacities to ensure their relevance for societal security, as well as a degree to which this task should, in certain areas, determine the scope of the Armed Forces’ activities. The balance between promoting societal security and carrying out the Armed Forces’ primary missions in relation to the security of the realm must also be assessed.
The key elements on which the Chief of Defence’s recommendations are based are changes in the security situation, the operational capability of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and the financial framework within which the Armed Forces must carry out their missions.

**THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES IN A NEW SITUATION**

The Norwegian Armed Forces are NATO’s first line of defence. The Armed Forces must therefore constitute a first line of defence that is both relevant and credible.

**CHANGED DEFENCE AND SECURITY SITUATION**

Norway finds itself in a more demanding security situation, and new challenges within NATO’s adjacent areas actualise changes in defence policy. We must guard against threats, including conventional and asymmetrical challenges, hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks, terrorism and the growth of extremism.

The situation in the High North is also changing, due in part to the region’s geopolitical and military strategic importance to Russia. Nuclear weapons are of high priority in the current modernisation of Russia’s military forces, and the bases for many of Russia’s strategic ballistic missiles are located on the Kola Peninsula. We must presume that this modernisation of operative capability will continue. In addition, the country has shown increasing willingness to use military force against its neighbouring countries.

Although Russia is currently not viewed as a direct threat to Norway, the possibility cannot be ruled out that Norway may be drawn into a conflict because of its geographical significance near Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons or in support of Allied forces pursuant to NATO Article 5. The heightened tension of the political situation between Russia and the West adds to the uncertainty and unpredictability.

Norwegian security and defence policy is based on membership of NATO, which must have adequate combative strength to deter potential adversaries. In the event of crisis or war, Norway must rely on Allied reinforcements, and the Norwegian Armed Forces are NATO’s first line of defence. The Armed Forces must therefore constitute a first line of defence that is both relevant and credible.

**STATUS OF NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES’ OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY**

The main objective for the current long-term period has been to continue to develop a capable force and strengthen the Armed Forces’ capacity to perform its assigned missions. There is much within the Armed Forces that is successful: the personnel are highly motivated, training and exercises are performed at a high level, and daily operations, both domestically and internationally, are carried out in a highly satisfactory manner.

Ageing material, however, poses a challenge to fulfilling missions; there is a need for renewal and it will entail high maintenance costs. A maintenance backlog and a lack of replacement parts lead to reduced operational availability. In certain areas the Armed Forces also lack personnel and certain kinds of competency, particularly in the Home Guard, Air Force and Navy.

Vital parts of the defence structure lack the agility, responsiveness and resilience required by major changes around us. The previous assumptions about early warning have changed, necessitating greater readiness, agility, responsiveness, presence and mobility.

**FINANCIAL BASELINE**

We have defined a financial reference framework for this review by calculating the costs of continuing the agreed-on structure in a 20-year perspective (2015–2034). The baseline has been calculated and detailed using the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s tools for long-term structural cost calculations. The same tool has been used in the other structural calculations in this review.

A key element of the calculations is future defence-specific cost growth (see fact box in Chapter 2 of the Strategic Defence Review’s full Norwegian version). Both operational and investment costs increase as a result of the need to maintain the Armed Forces’ relative impact.

The Chief of Defence therefore proposes that this demonstrated real growth in defence costs is included as part of the defence planning. To support long-term balance between missions, structure and resources, the defence-specific cost growth must be recouped.

The financial baseline confirms that the Chief of Defence has a difficult starting point for his Strategic Defence Review. Compared with a 2015-level budget, the agreed-on structure is estimated to require funding of roughly NOK 180 billion over 20 years. However, this structure will not meet the defence and security policy challenges described in the Norwegian Minister of Defence’s formal request.

The financial challenges for the agreed-on structure are unevenly distributed over the period. From today to 2020 the increase in demand will run to roughly NOK 39 billion. In the short term, the challenge is primarily related to the costs of operating the agreed-on structure in accordance with the current ambitions. Among other things, the cumulative backlog in material maintenance and spare parts will amount to a total of NOK 2.5 billion.

A lower annual budget level resulting from the Government’s de-bureaucratisation and efficiency-raising reform has been taken into account. If nothing is invested back into the defence sector, the effects of the reform overall will amount to over NOK 33 billion over 20 years.

Real growth in the cost of procuring and operating modern military materiel, the defence-specific cost growth of maintaining defence capabilities, comprises over NOK 90 billion for this 20-year period.

In the longer term, the challenges are related to costs-intensive investment projects and the corresponding increased need for funds for operation. The increased demand related to operating, modernising and renewing the agreed-on structure comprises more than NOK 90 billion over 20 years.

*Vital parts of the defence structure lack the agility, responsiveness and resilience required by major changes around us.*
The analyses forming the basis for this review illustrate the imbalance between the Armed Forces’ operational capabilities and the requirements generated by new developments in the security situation. A credible defence of Norway is only to be achieved through NATO. The reduced warning time requires the Armed Forces to be a relevant first line of defence for NATO in Norway and to ensure that Allied support can be received. The Norwegian Armed Forces need stronger intelligence, surveillance and situational awareness capabilities. We must develop greater agility, responsiveness and mobility. In addition to resilience, to carry out independent national operations until Allied forces are able to reinforce Norwegian defence efforts. The Armed Forces must also be capable of receiving and supporting these reinforcements. The ability to conduct operations is furthermore dependent on good protection of critical capabilities and infrastructure. Establishing a more efficient Norwegian Armed Forces is necessary to be able to relocate resources to higher-priority activities. Multinational cooperative solutions must be employed where appropriate. A new personnel structure with a higher proportion of specialists will strengthen operational competencies. In combination with a customised combination of compulsory military service and an improved scheme for reserves, these measures will serve to advance the Armed Forces’ operational capabilities.

To be a credible partner in NATO, the Norwegian Armed Forces must be strengthened by being provided with the necessary combative strength, presence and resilience to respond effectively to an attack on Norway. An adversary is to be deterred because a direct conflict with Norwegian Armed Forces is necessary to be able to discourage potential aggressors. The Armed Forces must be capable of confronting and striking back in the event of aggression that may activate Article 5 of the NATO treaty. The next level, reinforcement, involves the capability to reinforce a NATO area with military forces. This capability requires plans for staging forces and the recipient country’s ability to receive and transport those forces to the areas of operation. The changed security situation requires the Armed Forces to update and detail their capability to receive Allied reinforcements. The third level of deterrence is the national first line of defence. Norway does not have Allied forces stationed on its territory in peace-time, and therefore Norwegian Armed Forces constitute the first line of defence. For this first line of defence to serve as a credible deterrent, Norway must be able to exert immediate and effective resistance in the course of an attack. Above all this will require reduced response time and greater agility and responsiveness. It is fundamentally important for a first line of defence to have no serious weaknesses that an adversary can readily exploit, and to possess a broad array of capabilities and tactics, rooted in the development of the existing structure. The current size of the Armed Forces makes it necessary to combine military presence with the capability to confront the enemy wherever the aggressive actions or attack may come. Presence is critical to ensure continuous national control. In addition, responsiveness and combative capability must be strong in every domain and area that is not covered on a daily basis. The future Armed Forces must be capable of confronting and striking back at an aggressor. Intelligence and surveillance comprise the uppermost level of the deterrence threshold and are critical for identifying, as early as possible, enemy build-up for the use of force against Norway. Intelligence and surveillance must be robust, since the information collected forms the basis for deploying Norwegian Armed Forces capabilities and implementing reinforcement plans.

STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW 2015 BY THE NORWEGIAN CHIEF OF DEFENCE

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A credible defence of Norway is only to be achieved through NATO. The reduced warning time requires the Armed Forces to be a relevant first line of defence for NATO in Norway and to ensure that Allied support can be received.

The Norwegian Armed Forces need stronger intelligence, surveillance and situational awareness capabilities. We must develop greater agility, responsiveness and mobility. In addition to resilience, to carry out independent national operations until Allied forces are able to reinforce Norwegian defence efforts. The Armed Forces must also be capable of receiving and supporting these reinforcements. The ability to conduct operations is furthermore dependent on good protection of critical capabilities and infrastructure.

Establishing a more efficient Norwegian Armed Forces is necessary to be able to relocate resources to higher-priority activities. Multinational cooperative solutions must be employed where appropriate. A new personnel structure with a higher proportion of specialists will strengthen operational competencies. In combination with a customised combination of compulsory military service and an improved scheme for reserves, these measures will serve to advance the Armed Forces’ operational capabilities.

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OTHER UNDERLYING FACTORS

Promoting development of a modern and technologically advanced Armed Forces

New technology remains a cornerstone in the development of the Armed Forces since it provides the means for carrying out missions more effectively and with greater force.
Applying modern technology also helps to create a deterrent for adversaries. In this review, great emphasis is placed on equipping the Armed Forces with capabilities to meet tomorrow’s challenges. The technology includes unmanned systems that strengthen surveillance capabilities and reduce the risk of casualties and injury to personnel, enhanced satellite-based capacity for intelligence, surveillance and communication, and long-range, precision-guided weapons for responding to attacks over long distances.

Ensuring a cost-effective and sustainable Armed Forces structure

Regardless of budgetary level, there is a need for continual restructuring and streamlining in order to shape the Norwegian Armed Forces in a long-term, economically sustainable perspective. Efficiency-raising measures are primarily implemented in the following main areas:

- Consolidation of military establishments and activities: The Armed Forces’ base structure is neither adequately cost-effective nor operationally optimal. This review therefore emphasises cost-effective solutions for the Armed Forces’ overall activities.
- Reductions in management, staff administration and training: The Chief of Defence will streamline the governance and management model through improved work processes, more framework objectives and fewer reporting requirements. There is a need for a number of consolidating and co-locating measures to raise efficiency and reduce the number of person-years needed.
- Improving processes and cooperation for support services: For the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation, Joint Medical Services and Cyber Defence, it will be a priority to enhance the efficiency of support services through utilisation of civil-sector resources.

Personnel and competency

- Personnel: An Other Ranks (OR) system is being implemented. Along with changes in the Act relating to Armed Forces personnel, the introduction of OR will help to promote the best possible balance within the personnel and competency structure to safeguard the Armed Forces’ operational capabilities and operations. The plan is to introduce a personnel structure that increases the number of specialists while reducing the number of officers.
- Armed Forces education and training: Current training in the Armed Forces is of high quality and recruits effectively. Available training is fragmented, however, and is carried out at too many locations. Education and training must be streamlined and may in the future be consolidated where this can yield financial or professional returns.
- Compulsory military service: Gender-neutral compulsory national military service will be continued in accordance with the Armed Forces’ operational needs. National service will be standardised at a 12-month service period. A trial scheme adopting an 18-month national service will be evaluated.
- Reserve personnel: The current scheme for reserve forces for operative units will be refined. The scheme entails that each of Norway’s military branches maintains access to its own reserves in the force structure, including for training and exercises.

Multinational cooperation

The Norwegian Armed Forces currently participate in extensive multinational cooperation within the framework of NATO, the EU, NORDEFCO and other bi-/multilateral organisations. This cooperation encompasses joint participation in operations, joint procurement of materiel, and close cooperation on education, training and exercises. This type of cooperation has yielded many operational and financial benefits and should hold priority in the future as well. The Chief of Defence sees no immediate new returns emerging unless there is greater political will for multinational cooperation.

The Total Defence Concept and effective contributions towards societal security

The Total Defence Concept comprises society’s support for the Norwegian Armed Forces as well as Armed Forces support of civil society. There is a need to further develop and update the concept due to the importance this review gives to armed deterrence and the role as first line of defence for NATO.

Civil support for the Armed Forces: In the event of crisis or war, the Armed Forces will need support from civil society in the form of goods, services and access to infrastructure beyond what the Armed Forces currently have at their disposal. Civil-sector support will be necessary for maintaining relevant defence capabilities within realistic financial constraints and for receiving and supporting Allied reinforcements in a crisis.

The Armed Forces’ support for civil society: The main principle that the Armed Forces are to contribute their resources as needed upon request should still apply. No new military capabilities or structures are recommended established for the specific purpose of carrying out support for civil society, but new helicopters for the Special Forces may also serve as an important resource for the performance of police duties.

Read more about the basic analyses and the various parts of the Armed Forces in Chapter 3 of the Norwegian full version of the defence review and at forsvar.no
Military structure recommended by the Norwegian Chief of Defence

A BALANCED DEFENCE

The Chief of Defence recommends a re-organisation of the military defence structure in response to today’s security challenges. The new structure makes it possible to execute the most challenging missions and at the same time strengthens the Armed Forces as part of NATO.
The Armed Forces procure strategic surveillance capabilities, unmanned sensors and satellite capacity. This will significantly strengthen surveillance, early warning, intelligence-gathering and decision support capabilities.

Capabilities for target selection, direction of joint fires and target analysis are enhanced.

Armed Forces firepower is augmented by procuring F-35 fighter aircraft with weapons such as the Joint Strike Missile, submarines, upgraded tanks and new artillery.

The numbers of fully manned naval vessels and Armed Forces restocked warehouses are increased and logistics preparedness improved. These measures will provide better availability of forces and other capabilities while extending resilience.

The presence of army, naval and air forces in Northern Norway is reinforced and the compulsory military service maintained. The Home Guard is differentiated and rapid reaction units emphasised. These measures will enhance preparedness as well as agility and responsiveness.

Protection against airborne threats is strengthened by developing and procuring a mobile air defence and new air surveillance sensors.

The command structure is streamlined and improved. Armed Forces capacities in command, control and information systems are modernised.

Norway’s ability to accommodate Allied reinforcements is updated and enhanced.

Adequate training and exercises are emphasised, and a framework for more cost-effective training and exercises for international units in Norway is established.

The Armed Forces expands and focuses more attention on cooperation with civil society, by establishing memorandums of understanding with key civilian authorities. Capabilities for border patrol, King’s Guard duty, Coast Guard and helicopter rescue services are to remain strong. The Special Forces will receive organic helicopters that can also stand ready for police preparedness.

The military administration is streamlined and debureaucratised and resources reassigned to operational units. A strategic steering function is established within the Norwegian Defence Staff to streamline the use of ICT throughout the Armed Forces.

Activities are consolidated to fewer locations and the number of military establishments reduced according to operational needs.

The Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation is continued, comprised of the parts of the organisation that are not transferred to the new materiel agency or that fall naturally under the service branches. Logistics are to be refined to boost the capacity to support the operational structure, and concepts utilising capacity found in the civil-sector industry are to be further developed.

Cyber Defence is redesigned to target activities on operating common capacities within the Defence Information Infrastructure (INI). In addition, the head of Cyber Defence will have responsibility for the Armed Forces’ ICT training. Operations and training will continue, consolidated under a single unit.

The Joint Medical Services are further developed to support the Armed Forces’ operational needs. The strategic medical capacities are critical and marginal and must be utilised in a coordinated civilian-military perspective and through multinational cooperation. A coordination concept with the civilian public health service during times of peace, crisis, disaster and war is to be developed.
Developing the operational structure

**Norwegian Army**
- Brigade North is to be modernised through procurement of various types of advanced combat and support vehicles. The Army’s presence and combative strength in Finnmark and Troms counties will be expanded by strengthening the Border Guard with one Ranger unit, establishing a mechanised element from Brigade North at Porsangermoen camp and enhancing its mechanised presence in Troms. Overall this increases the availability of combat units that maintain a high state of readiness in the northernmost counties.

**Norwegian Home Guard**
- Increased presence and operational capability in the High North are to be prioritised. The Home Guard-17 district in Finnmark will be reinforced to safeguard territorial responsibility and receive reinforcements. The district will also be given capacity for anti-tank and electronic warfare. Rapid response units will be reinforced from 1,000 to 3,250 and will be able to mobilise rapidly to other parts of the country. The area structure will be reduced and dimensioned in accordance with prioritised objectives. The Home Guard-11 district and Naval Home Guard will be disbanded, levels of ambition differentiated and management, staff and administration adjusted accordingly.

**Norwegian Navy**
- Resilience and presence are to be enhanced through more crews and a higher activity level in the High North. The Navy will concentrate base activity around Haakonsvern and Ramsund. Capacity for mine countermeasures will develop new concepts, while the Tactical Boat Squadron and Coastal Ranger Command will be dismantled. Some of the competence from the latter will be transferred to other capacities. The corvettes will be continued until F-35 fighter aircraft are operational with Joint Strike Missiles. The Coast Guard is to be prioritised and dimensioned for peacetime assignments.

**Norwegian Air Force**
- Capabilities for preparedness and producing operational air power are to be further developed for high-intensity operations. The Air Force will be consolidated around establishments with high combat value for Norwegian and Allied forces. High-intensity combat capabilities will be strengthened and agility and responsiveness enhanced. Firepower will be enhanced by phasing in the F-35 fighter aircraft. Manned and unmanned aircraft will ensure effective surveillance. New air defence systems and airspace sensors will provide better situational awareness and protect weapons systems and key national assets.

**Norwegian Special Operation Forces (SOF)**
- The SOF’s leadership will be continued in close affiliation with Norwegian Armed Forces leadership. The SOF will be further developed with two combat units at Rena, one at Haakonsvern and two reserve units. In principle these units may be used seamlessly between different missions and preparedness assignments and are to be based on coordinated selection and training. There are plans underway to implement helicopters for SOF operations, operated by the Air Force.
The Norwegian Armed Forces are currently distributed across a substantial number of locations, and this structure for military establishments is neither cost-effective nor operationally optimal. Major, cost-intensive investment projects in the current and coming long-term planning periods are delaying necessary renovation of property, buildings and facilities. As a result the buildings are deteriorating and maintenance costs are increasing. On this basis, the following objectives for Armed Forces establishments and activities have been formulated:

- Steps must be taken to facilitate cost-effective solutions for collective defence-related activity.
- Armed Forces activity must be concentrated into fewer areas and near the country’s main communication arteries.
- Efforts must be launched to promote more-dynamic specialist environments.
- The need for flexibility must be given adequate consideration to ensure that future Norwegian military establishments can be further developed in accordance with future demands.

This will offer major advantages with regard to the most efficient reception of Allied forces in a crisis situation and their further transport and logistic support to areas of operation. This long-term consolidation will be necessary to realise the recommended structure.

**RECOMMENDED STRUCTURE FOR NORWEGIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS**

Concentrating logistic activity along the country’s main communication/ICT arteries achieves economies of scale as well as logistic, ICT-related and operational synergies.

This will offer major advantages with regard to the most efficient reception of Allied forces in a crisis situation and their further transport and logistic support to areas of operation. This long-term consolidation will be necessary to realise the recommended structure.

**NORWEGIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS RECOMMENDED CONTINUED**

**NORWEGIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS RECOMMENDED CLOSED**

**JOINT**
- Åsbergarden
- Høvsemøn
- Kyrkjanestraumen
- Vølsoy
- Nykjer

**LAND**
- Høvsemøn
- Gründen 22
- Dombås
- Setesdalsmoen
- Nærøy

**SEA**
- Trondenes
- Hanstadbjørndal

**AIR**
- Andøy
- Kjerke

**JOINT**
- Jørstadmoen
- Austfjord
- Storhorn
- Vølsoy
- Nykjer

**LAND**
- Høvsemøn
- Gründen 22
- Dombås
- Setesdalsmoen
- Nærøy

**SEA**
- Trondenes
- Hanstadbjørndal

**AIR**
- Andøy
- Kjerke

**The military establishments that the Chief of Defence recommends continuing (shown in green) are particularly critical for supporting the Armed Forces operational structure. The establishments recommended closed are shown in red.**

The figure illustrates a structure for military establishments concentrated along Norway's main communication arteries.
Military structure recommended by the Norwegian Chief of Defence

4

Summary of the recommended Norwegian military structure

The recommended military structure meets the challenges described in the Norwegian Minister of Defence’s formal request.

The military structure described in the preceding pages represents a marked departure from Norway’s current capable force. The capability to defend Norway and its allies against threats, aggressive actions and attack within the NATO framework is substantially strengthened. The recommendation attaches particular importance to significantly enhanced agility and responsiveness, heightened preparedness and reinforced manning at several units. The structure gives Norway a national, independent ability to tackle the most difficult challenges related to armed attack for a limited timeframe. In addition to enhancing the Norwegian Armed Forces’ agility and responsiveness, the structure satisfies the need for presence in important areas with advanced capabilities.

In addition, the structure can accommodate challenges related to coercive diplomacy backed up by military measures, upholding national sovereignty, exercising national authority, terrorism and international operations.

Together the recommended measures provide a balanced defence whose structure is based on strict prioritisation and designed for facing the most demanding challenges. Moreover, this re-organisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces structure makes it possible to build up capacities by means of additional initiatives and prioritisation via the defence budgets.

FINANCIAL PREREQUISITES

The Chief of Defence recommends an Armed Forces structure that is substantially strengthened. The recommendation attaches particular importance to significantly enhanced agility and responsiveness, heightened preparedness and reinforced manning at several units. The structure gives Norway a national, independent ability to tackle the most difficult challenges related to armed attack for a limited timeframe. In addition to enhancing the Norwegian Armed Forces’ agility and responsiveness, the structure satisfies the need for presence in important areas with advanced capabilities.

The Chief of Defence recommends increasing the defence budget framework by roughly NOK 27 billion in 2017, and increasing it thereafter to a level in 2020 that is NOK 11.5 billion above the current budget. Over the entire recommendation corresponds to an increase of just under NOK 30 billion in the 2017–2020 period and will require adjustment in the timing of investments in order to postpone parts of the escalation in funding needed to the period after 2024.

For the 2017–2028 period, increased operational costs comprise NOK 41 billion. Investments in priority capabilities - such as submarines, strategic intelligence resources, helicopters for the Special Operation Forces, armoured and light armoured vehicles, surveillance and intelligence aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, upgrades of transport planes and frigates, and procurement of new Coast Guard vessels - comprise NOK 49 billion. Investments in property, buildings and facilities are calculated to be NOK 90 billion.

If the budget framework is expanded beyond the parameters of the moderate structure, the following capabilities are recommended, in order of priority:

1. Extend anti-submarine capability in new surveillance platforms, i.e. by procuring an adequate fleet of maritime patrol aircraft.
2. Extend a structure of six submarines and procure six new ones starting in 2025.
3. Strengthen ground-force capability and presence in Norway by creating a new brigade with appurtenant matériel.
4. Procure new helicopters for the Army.
5. Increase the number of precision-guided weapons.

Recommended investments within an expanded budget framework

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2. Extend a structure of six submarines and procure six new ones starting in 2025.
3. Strengthen ground-force capability and presence in Norway by creating a new brigade with appurtenant matériel.
4. Procure new helicopters for the Army.
5. Increase the number of precision-guided weapons. 
A gradual reduction in the scope of Norwegian military capabilities would thus be unavoidable, and would leave obvious weaknesses in Norwegian defence capabilities. Operational and investment costs would have to be reduced, and structure and military establishments would have to be significantly scaled back. Cuts would also have to be implemented in the operational structure and be viewed in context with the available funding for investment.

The brigade-structure ambition for the Norwegian Army would have to be abandoned. Several battalions would be downsized, procurements and upgrades of tanks would not be possible and one Army camp would be phased out.

The Norwegian Navy’s submarines, corvettes and minesweepers would be phased out. Fewer F-35 fighter aircraft would be procured for the Norwegian Air Force. His Majesty The King’s Guard would be downsized to a reduced battalion.

For command and control, activity at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters would be substantially decreased, concentrated on surveillance, situational awareness and development of emergency plans. The same organisation and governance and management model would be used as in the recommended structure but with additional personnel cuts.

In downsizing the Norwegian Armed Forces, emphasis is placed on preserving activities related to coercive diplomacy, receiving Allied forces, upholding national sovereignty, exercising national authority and contributing to NATO. A national ambition to form an adequate first line of defence would have to be abandoned, and the ability to deal with the most serious security situations would be severely curtailed.
Limiting Norwegian Armed Forces capabilities to accommodate a cost level lower than the current structure will trigger far-reaching changes.

Norway can lower the risks inherent in its defence deficiences by tailoring them to the capacity strengths that NATO can offer at extremely short notice. Aircraft, and particularly fighters, is the capability that NATO can provide most quickly, and which can provide a significant boost to Allied combative strength in defence of Norway. As NATO’s northern flank and neighbour to Russia, Norway will need fighter aircraft on a daily basis. A national capability in this area is therefore essential, but given a reduced level of sustainability. The extension of a compensated, 2015-level budget entails a gradual, steady downscaling of the Armed Forces. Consequently, there is less need for conscripts. This trend will continue, and resilience in the remaining structural elements.

Neither a zero-growth budget based on the 2015 level nor a budget trajectory of 0.5 per cent annual real growth is viewed as adequate for maintaining long-term financial sustainability. The extension of a compensated, 2015-level budget entails a gradual, steady downscaling of the Armed Forces. This will require ongoing assessments of which capabilities, from an operations standpoint, are most desirable to keep.

At the same time, decisions will have to be taken on decreasing activities or phasing out capabilities when the budget is no longer adequate to maintain a sound operational level. As with the recommended defence structure, peacetime capability is to be maintained to exercise national authority and uphold national sovereignty. Strategic capabilities for timely intelligence-gathering, surveillance and target acquisition will be prioritised.

Capacity to safeguard Allied reinforcements will be prioritised as far as possible. It will be increasingly incumbent on Allied forces to provide their own means of protection. Even with reduced breadth of Armed Forces capabilities, there is a need to enhance responsiveness, preparedness and resilience in the remaining structural elements.

NORWEGIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS RECOMMENDED CONTINUED

**JOINT**
- Bodø
- Alesund
- Karmøy
- Kristiansand
- Mandal
- Tromsø
- Ålesund

**LAND**
- Haukedalen
- (incl. border stations)
- Porsanger
- (new Bardufoss camp)
- Seljord
- Rena
- Tønsberg
- Lindesæter
- Hvosnes
- Heistad
- Osebu
- Bergenhus
- Drøbak

**SEA**
- Haakonshavn
- Ramund
- Wallenmoen

**AIR**
- Sarpsborg
- Ørland
- Bardufoss
- Gardermoen
- Vaernes
- Sogndal
- Baneset
- Base for rescue helicopters
- Sofa
- Flore
- Ørland
- Bodø
- Baneset

**JON**
- Åsgård Brutabakken
- Karmøy
- Mandal
- Kristiansand
- Mandal
- Mandal
- Tromsø
- Ålesund

**LAND**
- Haukedalen
- (incl. border stations)
- Porsanger
- (new Bardufoss camp)
- Seljord
- Rena
- Tønsberg
- Lindesæter
- Hvosnes
- Heistad
- Osebu
- Bergenhus
- Drøbak

**SEA**
- Haakonshavn
- Ramund
- Wallenmoen

**AIR**
- Sarpsborg
- Ørland
- Bardufoss
- Gardermoen
- Vaernes
- Sogndal
- Baneset
- Base for rescue helicopters
- Sofa
- Flore
- Ørland
- Bodø
- Baneset

**Overview of Norwegian Armed Forces operational structure in 2024**

- Norwegian Joint Headquarters
- Intelligence Service
- Special Forces
- Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation
- Cyber Defence
- Joint Medical Services
- Joint NATO Air and Ground Surveillance
- Joint Strategic Air Transport (C-17)
- Tactical Land Command
- Telemark Battalion
- Armoured Battalion
- Intelligence Battalion
- Border Guard
- His Majesty The King’s Guard
- National Territorial Command
- 10 Home Guard Territorial Districts
- Rapid Reaction Forces (1 250 soldiers)
- Area structure (30 000 soldiers)
- Norwegian Task Group
- 5 frigates with 6 NH-90 helicopters
- 3 Mine Countermeasure Teams
- 1x2 logistics and support vessels
- 4 boarding teams
- 4x4 Outer Coastal Guard vessels with 8 NH-90s
- 5 Inner Coastal Guard vessels
- Logistic base, Navy
- Tactical air command (NADC)
- Control and Warning station
- Mobile Air Control unit
- Control and Warning chain
- Main base F-35 fighter aircraft
- Base defence battlegroup
- Main base surveillance/advance base for fighter aircraft
- 42 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters
- 4 surveillance aircraft
- Unmanned aerial systems
- 14 NH-90 naval helicopters
- Bell 412 helicopters for Special Forces
- 14 rescue helicopters
- 1 NASAMS Air Defence battalion
- 4 C-130 transport planes
- Logistic base, air

**PRIORITY UNDER FURTHER EXPANDED BUDGET PARAMETERS**

If the security and defence policy assessments lead to an expanded budget framework for the Norwegian Armed Forces, the following capabilities are to be prioritised:
1. Extend artillery competency and procure new Army artillery.
2. Procure area air defence.
3. Continue existing submarines.
4. Procure new helicopters for the Special Forces.

**STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW 2015 BY THE NORWEGIAN CHIEF OF DEFENCE**

**ABRIDGED VERSION**