Forskning ved IFS

​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Institutt for forsvarsstudier organisererer forskningen rundt fire temaer.

Større forskningsprogrammer samler ofte prosjekter fra flere forskjellige temaer og har egne sider. Vi har også en side hvor vi presenterer våre ferdige doktorgradsprosjekter.

 Temaer og aktiviteter

 

 

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 Artikler og bokkapitler av IFS-forskere

 

 

Lundestad, Ingrid. 2017. "Turning security importers to exporters? US strategy and cooperation with Northern Europe since 1993". Journal of Transatlantic Studies. Online 25 JuneLundestad, Ingrid. 2017. "Turning security importers to exporters? US strategy and cooperation with Northern Europe since 1993". Journal of Transatlantic Studies. Online 25 June<p>​<span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">Transatlantic burden-sharing debates often centre on defence expenditures and participation in missions out-of-area. An analysis of US strategy for cooperation with Nordic and Baltic countries during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies reveals how the United States has worked to promote security export much more broadly. It pursued contributions through in-area military installations, military partnership and missions, and political/economic cooperation promoting security and stability in Northern Europe, the Euro-Atlantic area, and far away. Global strategies and specific thinking regarding contributions from this region formed US policies. Developments were not linear; the United States took on commitments, even as it promoted increased burden-sharing.</span><br></p><p><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;"><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14794012.2017.1337684">Les artikkelen på nettsidene til Journal of Transatlantic Studies.</a></span></p><p><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">Ikke tilgang? Ta kontakt med Forsvarets høgskoles bibliotek: <a href="mailto:bibl@fhs.mil.no">bibl@fhs.mil.no</a></span></p>
Bekkevold, Jo Inge and Sunniva Engh. 2017. «Silk Road Diplomacy: China’s Strategic Interests in South Asia». In South Asia and the Great Powers: International Relations and Regional Security, edited by Stein Rynning. I.B. TaurisBekkevold, Jo Inge and Sunniva Engh. 2017. «Silk Road Diplomacy: China’s Strategic Interests in South Asia». In South Asia and the Great Powers: International Relations and Regional Security, edited by Stein Rynning. I.B. Tauris<p>​Where the implications of war and peace are open to question, the possibility of change depends more on politics than economics. This book asks whether the region's great powers can overcome opposing interests and commit to political restraint. The concept of regional security is based on great power support for regional order. However, there are many pitfalls to consider: notably, the politics of contested nationalisms; the Asia-Pacific rivalry of China and the US; and India's inclinations to function - or be seen - as a benevolent hegemon for the region. </p><p>Yet there are signs of renewed determination to move the region in new directions. While China's Silk Road projects are long-term regional investments that hinge on regional stability, the US is attempting to fashion new partnerships and India strives to reconcile regional differences to promote a peaceful environment.</p><p>This book, as it sets out the emerging agendas of the great powers and local powers, makes a significant contribution to a better understanding of the international relations and diplomatic politics of South Asia.<br></p><p><a href="http://www.ibtauris.com/en/Books/Society%20%20social%20sciences/Politics%20%20government/International%20relations/Geopolitics/South%20Asia%20and%20the%20Great%20Powers%20International%20Relations%20and%20Regional%20Security?menuitem=%7bF66D6451-D7DF-403F-A234-82FAE9B3F795%7d">Read more about the book on the I.T. Tauris' website</a><br></p>
Røseth, Tom. 2017. "Russia’s energy relations with China: passing the strategic threshold?" Eurasian Geography and Economics. online 16 MarchRøseth, Tom. 2017. "Russia’s energy relations with China: passing the strategic threshold?" Eurasian Geography and Economics. online 16 March<p>​<span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">This article examines Russian energy policies toward China over the past decade as reluctant engagement changed into a priority energy partnership. </span></p><p><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">From 2008 to 2016 Russian and Chinese companies signed several major oil and gas agreements, a period in which Moscow reassessed China as a future energy consumer and lifted bilateral cooperation to a new level. The article utilizes the strategic partnership concept as an analytical framework and finds traditional realist concepts and hedging inadequate for this particular case. </span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">T</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">he study illuminates Russian geopolitical considerations and acceptance of vulnerability, which combined make long-term Russian energy policies more China dependent. </span></p><p><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">Officially, Russia seeks diversification among Asian energy buyers, but its focus has increasin</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">gly b</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">een on China. Western sanctions imposed in 2014 for Russia’s role in Ukraine accelerated this trend. Moscow’s </span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">energy policies</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;"> toward Beijing with its pipelines and long-term agreements are permanent arrangements that resemble strategic</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;"> partnership policies. China is eager to increase energy relations with Russian companies, but Beijing also ensures that it does not become too dependent on one supplier. Russian concern over its increased dependence on China i</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">n the East is deemed secondary to expanding Russia’s customer base beyond the still-dominant European market.</span></p><p><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;"><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15387216.2017.1304229" target="_blank">To read the full article, visit the Eurasian Geography and Economics's website (limited access)​</a></span></p><p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"segoe ui", sans-serif;">Hvis du mangler tilgang: kontakt Forsvarets høgskolens bibliotek:<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span></span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:calibri, sans-serif;"><a href="mailto:bibl@fhs.mil.no"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"segoe ui", sans-serif;color:#663399;">bibl@fhs.mil.no</span></a></span>​<br></p>
Allers, Robin. 2017. "Modern deterrence? NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence on the eastern flank". In NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century, edited by Karsten Friis. RoutledgeAllers, Robin. 2017. "Modern deterrence? NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence on the eastern flank". In NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century, edited by Karsten Friis. Routledge<p>​​​​This book presents a cutting-edge assessment of NATO's collective defence strategies in the immediate aftermath of the July 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit.</p><p>Collective defence and deterrence came back on the agenda at the 2014 Wales Summit following the Russian annexation of Crimea, and was in many respects a game changer for NATO. The Warsaw Summit was a follow-up and operationalization of the Wales Summit, as well as adding further initiatives to the agenda. But is NATO delivering? </p><p>This book provides a thorough assessment of the on-going debates and discussions taking place within and outside of NATO in Europe and North America. In its return to deterrence, NATO is confronted with challenges relating to strategic thinking, capability development, and the role of nuclear weapons. It has also raised questions about the future prospects for NATO membership for countries such as Sweden and Finland, with broader implications for the security situation in the Baltic region. Central to all this is of course NATO's relationship with Russia and questions of a new security dilemma, in turning bringing to the fore the challenge of maintaining an appropriate balance between deterrence and dialogue. </p><p>The chapters in this volume address these questions and provide a much-needed analysis of the results of the NATO Warsaw Summit.</p><p><a href="https://www.routledge.com/NATO-and-Collective-Defence-in-the-21st-Century-An-Assessment-of-the-Warsaw/Friis/p/book/9780415786294" target="_blank">To learn more about the book, go to t​​he Routledge website.</a></p>
Hsiung, Christopher Weidacher. 2016. "China and Arctic energy: drivers and limitations." Polar Journal, online 26 OctoberHsiung, Christopher Weidacher. 2016. "China and Arctic energy: drivers and limitations." Polar Journal, online 26 October<p>​​​China's growing demand for oil and gas is forcing the country to look abroad to secure new sources of imports. The Arctic region could function as such a source, and Chinese oil companies have already started to engage in oil and gas exploration and production there. </p><p>The literature has tended to take this as evidence that China will become an increasingly active and important player in Arctic oil and gas resource developments. This article, however, argues that China's Arctic oil and gas interests are in fact modest. Domestic views on Chinese involvement in Arctic gas and resource development have been mixed and cautious, indicating a wait-and-see approach. There have been few concrete Chinese investments, further indicating limited interest. Only the onshore Yamal LNG project in the Russian Arctic can be characterised as substantial Chinese participation. </p><p>The challenges and high costs of oil and gas production in the Arctic, China's increased import options, the current economic slowdown in China and security developments in the Arctic region all impact China's motivations and possibilities for participation in the development of Arctic energy resources.</p><a href="https://www.fni.no/publications/china-and-arctic-energy-drivers-and-limitations-article1143-290.html" target="_blank"><p>The article is part of a project run by ​​The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Go the institute's website to access the article.​</p></a>
Allers, Robin. 2016. "The framework nation: can Germany lead on security?" International Affairs 92 (5)Allers, Robin. 2016. "The framework nation: can Germany lead on security?" International Affairs 92 (5)<p class="forsvaretElement-p">​​​Can Germany lead on security? This article aims to address this question by looking at recent German contributions to European defence cooperation. In 2013 Germany introduced the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) as a systematic and structured approach towards joint capability development. The concept relies on the idea that bigger nations take the overall responsibility for coordinating the contributions of smaller partners in a capability package. </p><p class="forsvaretElement-p">The framework nation model as such is not new but the initiative has been welcomed as a potential game changer in European defence cooperation and as confirmation of Germany's commitment to NATO. In light of the Ukraine crisis, measures to adapt NATO and to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance have become more urgent. Allies and partners increasingly want Germany to extend its role as Europe's dominant economic and financial power to matters of security and defence. </p><p class="forsvaretElement-p">The framework nation model allows Germany to take international responsibility, while avoiding debates about leadership and hegemony. Moreover, as a framework nation, Germany can advance flexible cooperation among a smaller number of allies without undermining its commitment to multilateralism. But the FNC initiative also raises further questions: what is the added value of the framework nation model compared to similar formats; what should be the place of smaller groupings in the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture; and how reliable is Germany in the role of a lead nation?</p><p class="forsvaretElement-p"><a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12702/full">Read the article in full text.</a></p><p class="forsvaretElement-p">Hvis du mangler tilgang: kontakt Forsvarets høgskolens bibliotek: <a href="mailto:bibl@fhs.mil.no?subject=Bestilling%20av%20artikkel">bibl@fhs.mil.no</a></p><p><br></p>
Haaland, Torunn. 2016. "The Limits to Learning in Military Operations. Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012". Journal of Strategic Studies, online 11 JulyHaaland, Torunn. 2016. "The Limits to Learning in Military Operations. Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012". Journal of Strategic Studies, online 11 July<p>​​​This article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:1.875em;line-height:26px;font-size:16px;box-sizing:content-box;color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;background-color:#ffffff;">​<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/JWQVPtxDBBz4ZrVqQIa3/full" target="_blank" style="color:#877040;text-decoration:underline;box-sizing:content-box;transition:0.3s;background:transparent;">To read the article, go to the Journal of Strategic Studies website</a>. </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:1.875em;line-height:26px;font-size:16px;box-sizing:content-box;color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;background-color:#ffffff;">Kontakt Forsvarets høgskolens bibliotek hvis du mangler tilgang: <a href="mailto:bibl@fhs.mil.no" style="color:#877040;text-decoration:underline;box-sizing:content-box;transition:0.3s;background:transparent;">bibl@fhs.mil.no</a>​</p>
Bruusgaard, Kristin Ven. 2016. "Russian Strategic Deterrence". Survival 54 (4)Bruusgaard, Kristin Ven. 2016. "Russian Strategic Deterrence". Survival 54 (4)<p>​​​Russia's intention to conduct a Ukraine-style hybrid operation against a NATO country is uncertain, but its determination to deter NATO from encroaching on Russia's security interests is clear.</p><p>Although many Western analysts are preoccupied with the likelihood of Russia plotting 'hybrid warfare' operations against NATO members, the concept itself is not an explicit part of Russian military doctrine. For Russian analysts, hybrid warfare is a Western construct. A reading of Russian military–theoretical debates shows a preoccupation with a broader concept, which can be termed strategic deterrence (<em>strategicheskoe sderzhivanie</em>). This Russian concept is part of official doctrine and strategy, and understanding it is crucial to analysing current and future Russian security and defence policy.</p><p>Strategic deterrence is the indigenous concept that encompasses what others call Russia's 'hybrid warfare doctrine', Russia's 'ability for cross-domain coercion' and Russia's 'nuclear brinkmanship'. The Russian concept, which can be translated as 'strategic deterrence', is conceived much more broadly than the traditional Western concept of deterrence. It is not entirely defensive: it contains offensive and defensive, nuclear, non-nuclear and non-military deterrent tools. These are to be used in times of peace and war – making the concept resemble, to Western eyes, a combined strategy of containment, deterrence and coercion – using all means available to deter or dominate conflict. Strategic deterrence provides a guide to how Russia may seek to influence any potential adversary, including NATO, in the future. Russia's intention to conduct a Ukraine-style hybrid-warfare operation against a NATO country is uncertain; its intention to deter NATO from encroaching on Russia's security interests is not.</p><p>The strategic-deterrence concept sheds light on the future division of labour between Russia's conventional and nuclear weapons, challenging the Western assumption that Russian nuclear weapons continue to have an elevated role in Russian strategy. It depicts de-escalation as just one part of Russian deterrence thinking, and one that may be sought with the use of tools other than nuclear weapons. And it provides details on how non-military and military tools are combined in order to influence a potential adversary's assessment of Russia. This article seeks to understand what it means when official Russian documents state that 'Russia's strategic goals and defense policy will be realized through the use of strategic deterrence'.</p><p>This article is based on insights from debates in Russian military theoretical journals, primarily <em>Military Thought</em>, the official journal of the Russian General Staff. The main contributors to this journal are senior officers and military academics, as well as some key members of the country's military leadership, including former chiefs of General Staff. Although the debates in this journal do not reflect classified elements of Russian military strategy, they are likely to reflect the most pressing issues in Russian defence policy.​</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="box-sizing:content-box;margin-bottom:1.875em;font-size:16px;line-height:26px;color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;background-color:#ffffff;">​<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945" target="_blank" style="box-sizing:content-box;color:#877040;text-decoration:underline;transition:0.3s;background:transparent;">To read the article, go to the Survival website</a>. </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="box-sizing:content-box;margin-bottom:1.875em;font-size:16px;line-height:26px;color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;background-color:#ffffff;">Kontakt Forsvarets høgskolens bibliotek hvis du mangler tilgang: <a href="mailto:bibl@fhs.mil.no" style="box-sizing:content-box;color:#877040;transition:0.3s;background:transparent;">bibl@fhs.mil.no</a></p>
Norheim-Martinsen, Per Martin. 2016. "New sources of military change – armed forces as normal organizations". Defence Studies 16 (3)Norheim-Martinsen, Per Martin. 2016. "New sources of military change – armed forces as normal organizations". Defence Studies 16 (3)<p>​​​​The literature on how European states have adapted to the post-cold war security environment ffocuses invariably on different understandings of <em>military transformation</em>, a process which is seen as inherently different from other forms of organizational change. </p><p>However, as this paper argues, new management practices, going back to the introduction of so-called New Public Management (NPM) reforms throughout Europe in the 1980s, have eventually penetrated also the last bastion of the old state – the defense sector. </p><p>Taking a critical approach to the idea of military transformation and existing theories of military change, the paper demonstrates how other international developments have pushed towards what may be seen as a "normalization" of Europe's defense sectors. This has important implications for how we approach and understand change in contemporary defense organizations.</p><p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2016.1195234" target="_blank">To read the article, go to <em>Defence Studies </em>on the Taylor & Francis website. Limited access.​</a></p><p><a href="/hogskolene/forsvarets-hogskole/biblioteket-fhs" target="_blank">Artikkelen ligger bak betalingsmur. Ta kontakt med <b>Forsvarets høgskoles bibliotek </b>hvis du vil lese den.</a></p>
Petersson, Magnus. 2016. "The United States as the reluctant ally". Parameters 46 (1)Petersson, Magnus. 2016. "The United States as the reluctant ally". Parameters 46 (1)<p>​​US leadership in NATO has been declining since the <span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">Cold War ended. From a European perspective, the United States </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">looks more and more like a "reluctant ally." A re-nationalization of </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">European security could occur without strong US leadership. The </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">United States should, therefore, reassert itself in European secu</span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">rity affairs—not with costly troop contributions, but by facilitating </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">European unity and the development of relevant force structures.</span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">​</span></p><p><a href="http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Spring_2016/8_Petersson.pdf">Go to the Strategic Studies Institute's website to read the article​</a></p>
Østhagen, Andreas. 2016. "High North, Low Politics. Maritime Cooperation with Russia in the Arctic". Arctic Review on Law and Politics 7(1). Open accessØsthagen, Andreas. 2016. "High North, Low Politics. Maritime Cooperation with Russia in the Arctic". Arctic Review on Law and Politics 7(1). Open access<p>​​​Maritime activity is increasing in the Arctic. So is bilateral cooperation across maritime borders <span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">between coast guards intent on protecting natural resources, saving lives and assisting navigation.</span></p><p>As tensions rose between Russia and the West in 2014, due to the conflict in Ukraine, coast guard <span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">cooperation in the Bering and Barents Seas was unaffected. Why? How did the respective bilateral </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">cooperative structures between Norway/the United States and Russia develop, and why were they </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">deemed ''too vital to cancel'' in the aftermath of events in Ukraine? </span></p><p><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">This article examines how the </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">respective states have developed cooperative regimes since the 1970s, and subsequently how these </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">regimes have come to constitute the backbone of bilateral management of these vast and invaluable </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">maritime domains. The argument made is that the specific character of coast guards and their role </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">as stewards of the sea separate them from other military structures, making bilateral cooperation </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">not only valuable, but indispensable, to the management of the states' maritime sovereignty.</span></p><p><a href="https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/255/794">To read the article, please go to the website of the Arctic Review on Law and Politics​</a> This is an open access article. </p>
Allers, Robin. "Are We Doing Enough? Change and Continuity in the German Approach to Crisis Management". German Politics, published online 24 May 2016.Allers, Robin. "Are We Doing Enough? Change and Continuity in the German Approach to Crisis Management". German Politics, published online 24 May 2016.<p>​​​​In the two-and-a-half decades since unification Germany has developed a distinctive approach towards international crisis management. This approach accepts the need to engage in the full spectrum of military and civilian operations but maintains a clear preference for the latter. Consequently, the European Union with its profile as a civil–military actor in international security is the preferred framework for German contributions. </p><p>The article analyses the development of the German approach during the governments of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel in the light of three interlinked debates on German foreign policy: continuity and change; multilateralism; and leadership. The announcement of a more active German foreign policy in 2014 has reanimated these debates. </p><p>Concentrating its efforts on networked security and capacity building Germany has become an indispensable player in international crisis management. At the same time Germany's deeply rooted attachment to a culture of military restraint and continued reluctance to lead, limit its ability to work for necessary reforms at the European level.</p><p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/5QuZb2G95ynvYrW2Admu/full">To read the article, go to the Taylor& Francis website​</a>.</p>
Engh, Sunniva. 2016. "India's Myanmar policy and the 'Sino-Indian Great Game'". Asian Affairs 47(1)Engh, Sunniva. 2016. "India's Myanmar policy and the 'Sino-Indian Great Game'". Asian Affairs 47(1)<p>​<span style="color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:16px;line-height:26px;background-color:#ffffff;">​​​​​Recent literature has aimed to “deconstruct” the notion of a “Sino-Indian rivalry” in Myanmar. The argument is that China's leverage in Myanmar far outweighs India's, and that the Tatmadaw nevertheless prevents either country's manipulation of Myanmar. In contrast this article argues that the idea of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” still marks the Indian debate, thinking and policy on Myanmar. China's continued rise will remain a main driver behind India's Myanmar policy, and Myanmar will remain geostrategic relevant to India.​</span><br style="box-sizing:content-box;color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:16px;line-height:26px;background-color:#ffffff;"><br style="box-sizing:content-box;color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:16px;line-height:26px;background-color:#ffffff;"><span style="color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:16px;line-height:26px;background-color:#ffffff;">The article describes the historical legacy of India's relationship with Myanmar, discusses the role of China in Indian Myanmar policies, and examines the effects of Myanmar's democratization process. While the Myanmar playing field has changed, Indian perceptio​ns of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” are lasting.</span></p><p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03068374.2015.1130307">To read the article, go to the Taylor & Francis website</a> (ligger bak betalingsmur, ta kontakt med <a href="/hogskolene/forsvarets-hogskole/biblioteket-fhs">FHS bibliotek​</a> for å bestille)</p>
Martinsen, Kåre Dahl. 2016. "Avmektige parlamenter? - Assemblée nationale, House of Commons og Bundestags innflytelse over bruken av militærmakt". Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift 31(1).Martinsen, Kåre Dahl. 2016. "Avmektige parlamenter? - Assemblée nationale, House of Commons og Bundestags innflytelse over bruken av militærmakt". Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift 31(1).<p>​​​Bruken av militærmakt øker. Ofte sender regjeringene soldater ut på meget kort varsel, dermed er det ikke tilstrekkelig tid til at parlamentene kan informeres eller gi sin tilslutning. Samtidig har regjeringene behov for politisk ryggdekning. </p><p>I Tyskland, Frankrike og Storbritannia diskuteres det hvordan parlamentene skal kunne involveres tettere samtidig som regjeringene beholder handlefriheten til å reagere raskt når en krise oppstår. Artikkelen tar for seg hvordan maktforholdet mellom regjering og folkevalgte er organisert i de tre landene. De viktigste offentlige redskapene parlamentene har til å påvirke regjeringens politikk, spørretime, forsvarskomiteer og undersøkelseskommisjoner, analyseres for å se hvor effektive de er. </p><p>Mye av forskningen har dreid seg om nettopp en kartlegging av de formelle mulighetene som finnes. Konklusjonen som trekkes i denne artikkelen, er at det i mindre grad dreier seg om institusjonelle mekanismer og løsninger, men vel så mye om parlamentarikernes vilje til å bruke dem. Særlig når nasjonale styrker er del av en multinasjonal operasjon, er påvirkningsmulighetene – og viljen begrenset. </p><p>Avslutningsvis belyses kostnadene som parlamentenes avmakt medfører. Et eksempel er soldatenes kampmoral, en annen er velgernes eierskap til politiske beslutninger om å bruke militærmakt. Avmakten betyr også at konsekvensene av økt dronebruk for maktfordelingene mellom parlament og regjering i liten grad er blitt diskutert.</p><p><a href="https://www.idunn.no/nst/2016/01/avmektige_parlamenter_-_assemble_nationale_house_of_comm">Last ned artikkelen fra idunn.no (begrenset tilgang).​</a></p>
Lundestad, Ingrid. 2015. "Turning Foe to Friend? US Objectives in Including Russia in Post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic Security Co-operation". The International History Review, 22 December.Lundestad, Ingrid. 2015. "Turning Foe to Friend? US Objectives in Including Russia in Post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic Security Co-operation". The International History Review, 22 December.<p>​​​This article scrutinises four moments in the post-Cold War era where the United States engaged to include Russia in Euro-Atlantic security forums: the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; Partnership for Peace; Permanent Joint Council; and the NATO-Russia Council. The overall puzzle is: why did consecutive US administrations aim to formalise co-operation between NATO and Russia? Current tensions highlight the issue's significance, yet in the literature, there is no study looking specifically at these episodes of US efforts to integrate Moscow. Building on a broad set of primary sources, this article determines what we can now know of US objectives concerning the role of Russia in Euro-Atlantic co-operation. It concludes that US objectives moved from seeking new and stable relations between former adversaries, to facilitating US objectives in the Euro-Atlantic context with NATO enlargement, to expressing more global interests in confronting emerging crises and challenges, amongst others in the war on terror. Co-operation was limited to where interests were overlapping. Russia would not be placed in a position to influence NATO as an alliance. US officials remained hopeful that co-operation with Russia was possible, and would benefit all. At the same time, decisions would serve US interests should relations sour.</p><p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2015.1096806"><strong>Go to Taylor&Francis Online to download the article (limited access)</strong></a></p>
Kronvall, Olof & Magnus Petersson. 2015. "Doctrine and Defence Transformation in Norway and Sweden". Journal of Strategic Studies (special issue)Kronvall, Olof & Magnus Petersson. 2015. "Doctrine and Defence Transformation in Norway and Sweden". Journal of Strategic Studies (special issue)<p>​​​In this article Kronvall and Petersson analyse to what degree the three functions of doctrine proposed by Harald Høiback – doctrine as a tool of operations, a tool of education, and a tool of change – have driven defence transformation in two Scandinavian states, Norway and Sweden. They conclude that doctrine, both allied and national, has had some impact on defence transformation in both countries: through the operations in Afghanistan, through education both at the branch level and joint level, and through organizational adaption to (first) the US ‘RMA paradigm’ and (later) to the subsequent ‘COIN paradigm’. However, other factors, such as threat perception and defence spending, have also played an important role. It also remains to be seen whether the changes are ephemeral or of a more permanent nature.</p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115040"><p><strong>To download the article, go to the Taylor&Francis website (limited access)</strong></p></a>
Petersson, Magnus, Thomas Slensvik & Palle Ydstebø. 2015. "Introduction". Journal of Strategic Studies (special issue)Petersson, Magnus, Thomas Slensvik & Palle Ydstebø. 2015. "Introduction". Journal of Strategic Studies (special issue)<p>​This special issue contains articles contributing to the under<span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">standing of the role military doctrine plays in strategic theory and practice. The </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">authors scrutinize the function and development of doctrine, the use of force and </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">the role of doctrine, alliances and doctrine, and small states and doctrine. The </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">contributions are related to the wider scholarly and practical context of how </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">doctrine is developed and implemented. The authors use functional, cultural and </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">institutional explanations in their articles. They also give practical recommenda</span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">tions regarding how to increase the effectiveness of the doctrine development </span><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;">process, and the effectiveness of doctrine itself in relation to the use of force.</span></p><p><span style="font-size:1rem;line-height:1.625;"><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115039"><strong>To download the article, go to the Taylor&Francis website (limited access)</strong></a></span></p>
Gustavsen, Elin. 2015. "The construction of meaning among Norwegian Afghanistan veterans." International SociologyGustavsen, Elin. 2015. "The construction of meaning among Norwegian Afghanistan veterans." International Sociology<p>​​​This article examines the construction of meaning among a group of Norwegian Afghanistan veterans. On the basis of interview data, three frameworks of interpretation are identified that were consistently used by the participating veterans to communicate the meaning of their deployment: (1) a military framework, which generated meaning from the military- and job-related aspects of their service; (2) a societal framework, which allowed them to emphasize the societal value of the endeavour; and (3) a personal framework, for conveying the personal impact of their experience. These meaning making strategies are analysed from a cultural perspective, in particular the lack of a shared war experience that characterizes Norwegian society. The collective arena does not provide a settled manner for how to interpret such an experience, so the construction of meaning has to take place outside the societal realm.</p><p><a href="http://iss.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/11/12/0268580915613191.abstract"><strong>To download the article, go to the web pages of International Sociology (limited access).</strong></a><br></p>
Norheim-Martinsen, Per M. 2015. "Nye trusler endrer lite i norsk forsvarspolitikk" Internasjonal Politikk 73 (3): 403-411Norheim-Martinsen, Per M. 2015. "Nye trusler endrer lite i norsk forsvarspolitikk" Internasjonal Politikk 73 (3): 403-411<p>​<a href="https://www.idunn.no/ip/2015/03" target="_blank">​​Les hele artikkelen her på Internasjonal Politikks nettsider (krever abonnement) </a></p>
Zysk, Katarzyna and David Titley. 2015. "Signals, Noise, and Swans in Today’s Arctic". SAIS Review of International AffairsZysk, Katarzyna and David Titley. 2015. "Signals, Noise, and Swans in Today’s Arctic". SAIS Review of International Affairs<p>​​The Arctic is a unique maritime domain and physical environment that is changing faster than any other place on Earth. The trend of abrupt and substantial variations in ice coverage, increasing temperatures, waves and coastal erosion, and unusual weather patterns is likely to continue, given persistent emission of greenhouse gases, primarily by the world’s industrialized countries. These transformations, although non-linear, profoundly affect both weather and climate in much of the Northern Hemisphere, and spur political dynamics that force governments and organizations to form new policies toward the Arctic region. Numerous factors, including changes in energy prices, global shipping trends, environmental and governance policies all impact the trajectory and pace of Arctic development. Given Russia’s dominant position in the region, the country’s Arctic policies and relations with the outside world have a particularly strong bearing on the regional development. This article examines the “signals” (ongoing trends), the “noise” (short-term fluctuations) and the “swans” (the wild cards) in the environmental changes in the Arctic and their geopolitical implications. Considering the rate and scope of the multilayered regional transformations, this paper argues that it is best to focus on the signals and not the noise, or the short-term fluctuations, while hedging, to the best of our ability, against the wild cards.</p><p><a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/sais_review/v035/35.1.zysk.html">Read the full article in SAIS Review of International Affairs</a> <br></p>
Jo Gade, Gullow Gjeseth, Paal Sigurd Hilde, Katarzyna Zysk. 2015. Bidrag til " boken Norge og Russland", redigert av Tormod Heier og Anders Kjølberg. UniversitetsforlagetJo Gade, Gullow Gjeseth, Paal Sigurd Hilde, Katarzyna Zysk. 2015. Bidrag til " boken Norge og Russland", redigert av Tormod Heier og Anders Kjølberg. Universitetsforlaget<p><strong>Det siste tiåret har Norge og andre NATO-land rettet mer oppmerksomhet mot nordområdene og Arktis. </strong></p><p>Fremveksten av et mer selvbevisst Russland - med tydeligere stormaktsambisjoner og et mer potent forsvar - har aktualisert sikkerhetsutfordringene i nord. Dette påvirker også det norske handlingsrommet, politisk og militært. Norge balanserer mellom ulike hensyn, der det å skape forutsigbarhet og tillit i egne nærområder veies opp imot behovet for å støtte NATO når det utvises fasthet overfor Russland.<br><br>Sikkerhetsutfordringene i nordområdene har derfor mange likheter med den kalde krigens utfordringer. Samtidig er også mange av de viktigste rammebetingelsene endret. Russland er betydelig svakere og mindre enn det gamle Sovjetunionen. Den økonomiske avhengigheten mellom øst og vest er også mye større. Denne antologien analyserer de nye forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene. Med ulike innfallsvinkler diskuteres hvilke forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitiske ressurser norske myndigheter kan spille på, og hvilke utfordringer politikere og militære møter når potensielle kriser i nord må løses.<br><br>Bidragsytere: Tor Bukkvoll, Jacob Børresen, Gjert Lage Dyndal, Jo Gade, Gullow Gjeseth, Tormod Heier, Paal Sigurd Hilde, Geir Hønneland, Anne-Kristin Jørgensen, Anders Kjølberg, Harald Mathisen, Katarzyna Zysk, Kristian Åtland </p><p><a href="http://www.universitetsforlaget.no/nettbutikk/norge-og-russland-uf.html">Gå til Universitetsforlagets sider for mer om boken.</a><br></p>
Helge Danielsen. 2015. "American Culture as 'High Culture': U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in Norway, 1950-65". In Nordic Cold War Studies, Aleksanteri Cold War SeriesHelge Danielsen. 2015. "American Culture as 'High Culture': U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in Norway, 1950-65". In Nordic Cold War Studies, Aleksanteri Cold War Series<p>​<em>​​Nordic Cold War Cultures</em> explores representations of the cultural Cold War in the five Nordic countries. Taking into account various political contexts, the ten contributions—written by Nordic scholars—analyze the interaction between Nordic actors and the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union through propaganda, cultural diplomacy, media narratives, civil defense programs, the role of intellectuals, and the politics of memory. The volume adds a depth to a narrative otherwise dominated by political and diplomatic approaches and creates insights into the cultural experiences of each Nordic country. It demonstrates how a combination of cultural and political approaches can help explain symbolic interactions and hierarchical relationships as well as elite and public perceptions of—and attitudes towards—the Cold War as an ideological struggle.</p><p><a target="_blank" href="http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/publications/presentations/coldwar_series/cws_2015_2_nordic.html">Go to Aleksanteri Institute's website for more information</a><br></p>
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard. 2014. "Crimea and Russia’s Strategic Overhaul". Parameters 44 (3): 81-90Kristin Ven Bruusgaard. 2014. "Crimea and Russia’s Strategic Overhaul". Parameters 44 (3): 81-90<p>Russian operations in Crimea in 2014 demonstrated an enhanced ability for implementating strategy; Russia effectively combined military and state tools to reach its policy goals. That means new demands for Western defense planners. Confronting Russian military power in the future will require an expanded toolkit.<br><a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2014/11_BruusgaardKristin_Crimea%20and%20Russia%27s%20Strategic%20Overhaul.pdf">Go to Parameters and read the article in full text.</a><br></p>
Jo Inge Bekkevold and Kristine Offerdal. 2014. "Norway's High North Policy and New Asian Stakeholders". Strategic AnalysisJo Inge Bekkevold and Kristine Offerdal. 2014. "Norway's High North Policy and New Asian Stakeholders". Strategic Analysis<p>​This article examines the main drivers of Norway’s High North policy towards the new Asian stakeholders. The High North became a foreign policy priority for Norway in 2005, and Norway is building on the foundations of this policy by engaging new Asian stakeholders in Arctic affairs. An aspiration to impact Asian states’ views on Arctic developments early in their policy-making processes, including on the legal and institutional framework for the Arctic through diplomatic dialogue, is one factor explaining Norway’s engagement policy. Another important factor is shared interests in economic cooperation and research. Engaging Asia in Arctic affairs gives Norway an additional platform in its dialogue with Asian countries.</p>
Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning. 2014. "Japan's shifting military priorities: counterbalancing China's rise". Asian Security 10 (1): 1–21Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning. 2014. "Japan's shifting military priorities: counterbalancing China's rise". Asian Security 10 (1): 1–21<p>​This article analyses the most recent phase of Japan's security policy reform, focusing on its shifting priorities towards the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Japan–US alliance since mid-2010. From a realist perspective, it argues that these shifting military priorities first and foremost represent a traditional counterbalancing response to China's rise. Conforming to the logic inherent in balance of threat theory, it moreover argues that this balancing behavior is explained by a confluence of two primary factors, namely Japanese perceptions of aggressive Chinese behavior in the maritime domain and concerns relating to the changing distribution of capabilities in China's favor<em>.</em></p><p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2013.870157">Full text article in Asian Security (online subscription)</a></p>
Tom Røseth. 2014. "Russia's China Policy in the Arctic". Strategic Analysis 38 (6): 841–859Tom Røseth. 2014. "Russia's China Policy in the Arctic". Strategic Analysis 38 (6): 841–859<p>​This article discusses the type of partnership Russia pursues towards China in the Arctic. Through evidence, the author finds that while Russia may be aiming for an overall strategic partnership, Arctic developments on the whole conclude on a pragmatic approach. Russia needs assistance to develop the Arctic and an eastward diversification is opportune. Russia’s energy development in the Arctic indicates an emerging strategic co-operation with China, but policies towards Beijing concerning the Arctic Council and the Northern Sea Route prove to be more pragmatic. The general bilateral relationship gives incentives for expanding co-operation to the Arctic, but Russia’s sovereignty and security concerns limit the opportunities.</p><p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700161.2014.952942" target="_blank">Full text article in Strategic Analysis (subscription)</a></p>
Ian Bowers. 2014. "The Republic of Korea and Its Navy: Perceptions of Security and the Utility of Seapower". Journal of Strategic Studies 37 (3): 442–464Ian Bowers. 2014. "The Republic of Korea and Its Navy: Perceptions of Security and the Utility of Seapower". Journal of Strategic Studies 37 (3): 442–464<p>​Understanding the development of Republic of Korea (ROK) seapower is central in exploring the evolution and nature of its security consciousness. This article aims to examine how the wider East Asian maritime sphere has influenced ROK perceptions of its own security and how such perceptions have come into conflict with the needs of maintaining its deterrent capabilities within the peninsular context. In doing so it concludes that for the ROK seapower has been an expression of wider engagement and international developing security concerns but that it is curtailed and influenced by the realities of the threat from the North.</p><p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2014.900754">Full text article in Journal of Strategic Studies (online subscription)</a></p>
Øystein Tunsjø, 2013. Europe’s Favourable Isolation. Survival 55(6): 91–106Øystein Tunsjø, 2013. Europe’s Favourable Isolation. Survival 55(6): 91–106<p>The global power shift from the West to the East is contributing to an increasingly Asia-centric world and Europe's isolation from great-power politics. Economic crises and internal difficulties in European countries limit the role that they can play in global affairs. Simultaneously, two costly wars and economic turmoil have prompted the United States to prioritise East Asia in its foreign and defence policy. The US will rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific and China, and maintain its commitments towards the Middle East, but will scale back its presence in Europe.</p><p>Europe will necessarily play an insignificant role in great-power politics in Asia. But if European countries become accustomed to no longer being at the centre of world politics – and the United Kingdom, France and Germany in particular adjust to their declining significance – this marginalisation could be to their benefit. Indeed, the current global power shift from the West to the East offers an opportunity to avoid the traditionally destructive conflicts of 'high politics'; revitalise the EU; maintain NATO's relevance; strengthen Europe's neighbourhood policy in the Arctic, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa; ensure stability throughout Europe; and promote European countries' global economic interests.</p><p>The US stayed out of conflicts in Europe up until the First World War and relied on strengthening its position in the Western Hemisphere to expand its global commercial and security interests. The US sought to keep extra-hemispheric actors out and avoided being dragged into great-power conflicts in Europe. At the same time, it enlarged the scope of the Monroe Doctrine and went beyond isolationism by promoting regional political, economic and security cooperation, and establishing institutions to facilitate common hemispheric interests. America's neighbourhood policy, global economic ambition and avoidance of great-power conflicts in Europe facilitated its rise as the world's leading power. Its share of global wealth increased from 12% in 1830 to 38% in 1900. The US only assumed 'responsibility from the regional great powers for the balance of power in the transoceanic regions', as Robert S. Ross has put it, when it could no longer keep Europe and East Asia divided by relying on great-power balancing, and a great power threatened to achieve regional hegemony and expand into the Western Hemisphere.</p><p><a href="http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2013-94b0/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-december-2013-january-2014-0fda/55-6-06-tunsjo-fa5a" target="_blank">Full text article in Survivor (online subscription)</a></p>