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Norsk og europeisk sikkerhet

​​​​​​​​​​​​Forskerne ved Senter for norsk og europeisk sikkerhet analyserer forhold som påvirker Norges sikkerhet og norske interesser.

Daglig fatter land i våre nærområder beslutninger som får konsekvenser for Norge. Utviklingen i Nato, Russland, nordområdene og Nord-Europa er sentrale temaer for forskningen ved senteret.

 Artikler og bokkapitler om norsk og europeisk sikkerhet



Saxi, Håkon L.. 2017. «British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept». Defence Studies, 5 AprilSaxi, Håkon L.. 2017. «British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept». Defence Studies, 5 April<p>​​At NATO's 2014 Wales Summit, the UK and Germany unveiled two new initiatives for European defence cooperation, known, respectively, as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). Both were the result of economic pressures and the need to exercise intra-alliance leadership, but they represented very different approaches to cooperation. </p><p>The JEF was to be a UK-led contingency force for short-notice operations, selectively incorporating forces from allies and partners. </p><p>The FNC sought to coordinate capability development between groups of allies, centred on larger framework nations, to develop coherent capability-clusters available to meet NATO's force requirements. </p><p>The common denominator and novelty of the initiatives was the building of forces and capabilities multinationally by having major states act as framework nations for groups of smaller allies. The UK and Germany have ownership and continue to provide leadership to these initiatives. This is one key reason why they continue to evolve to accommodate changing circumstances and are likely to endure.</p><p></p><p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:arial, sans-serif;color:#333333;background:white;"><a href="" target="_blank">Download the article from ​Taylor & Frances website</a></span></p><p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:arial, sans-serif;color:#333333;background:white;">Hvis du mangler tilgang: kontakt Forsvarets høgskolens bibliotek:<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span></span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:calibri, sans-serif;color:#333333;background:white;"><a href=""><span style="font-size:10pt;color:#877040;"></span></a></span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:arial, sans-serif;color:#333333;background:white;">​</span>​<br></p>
Røseth, Tom. 2017. "Russia’s energy relations with China: passing the strategic threshold?" Eurasian Geography and Economics. online 16 MarchRøseth, Tom. 2017. "Russia’s energy relations with China: passing the strategic threshold?" Eurasian Geography and Economics. online 16 March<p>​<span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">This article examines Russian energy policies toward China over the past decade as reluctant engagement changed into a priority energy partnership. </span></p><p><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">From 2008 to 2016 Russian and Chinese companies signed several major oil and gas agreements, a period in which Moscow reassessed China as a future energy consumer and lifted bilateral cooperation to a new level. The article utilizes the strategic partnership concept as an analytical framework and finds traditional realist concepts and hedging inadequate for this particular case. </span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">T</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">he study illuminates Russian geopolitical considerations and acceptance of vulnerability, which combined make long-term Russian energy policies more China dependent. </span></p><p><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">Officially, Russia seeks diversification among Asian energy buyers, but its focus has increasin</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">gly b</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">een on China. Western sanctions imposed in 2014 for Russia’s role in Ukraine accelerated this trend. Moscow’s </span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">energy policies</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;"> toward Beijing with its pipelines and long-term agreements are permanent arrangements that resemble strategic</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;"> partnership policies. China is eager to increase energy relations with Russian companies, but Beijing also ensures that it does not become too dependent on one supplier. Russian concern over its increased dependence on China i</span><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;">n the East is deemed secondary to expanding Russia’s customer base beyond the still-dominant European market.</span></p><p><span style="color:#333333;font-family:"open sans", sans-serif;font-size:17.6px;"><a href="" target="_blank">To read the full article, visit the Eurasian Geography and Economics's website (limited access)​</a></span></p><p><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"segoe ui", sans-serif;">Hvis du mangler tilgang: kontakt Forsvarets høgskolens bibliotek:<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span></span><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:calibri, sans-serif;"><a href=""><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"segoe ui", sans-serif;color:#663399;"></span></a></span>​<br></p>
Hsiung, Christopher Weidacher. 2016. "China and Arctic energy: drivers and limitations." Polar Journal, online 26 OctoberHsiung, Christopher Weidacher. 2016. "China and Arctic energy: drivers and limitations." Polar Journal, online 26 October<p>​​​China's growing demand for oil and gas is forcing the country to look abroad to secure new sources of imports. The Arctic region could function as such a source, and Chinese oil companies have already started to engage in oil and gas exploration and production there. </p><p>The literature has tended to take this as evidence that China will become an increasingly active and important player in Arctic oil and gas resource developments. This article, however, argues that China's Arctic oil and gas interests are in fact modest. Domestic views on Chinese involvement in Arctic gas and resource development have been mixed and cautious, indicating a wait-and-see approach. There have been few concrete Chinese investments, further indicating limited interest. Only the onshore Yamal LNG project in the Russian Arctic can be characterised as substantial Chinese participation. </p><p>The challenges and high costs of oil and gas production in the Arctic, China's increased import options, the current economic slowdown in China and security developments in the Arctic region all impact China's motivations and possibilities for participation in the development of Arctic energy resources.</p><a href="" target="_blank"><p>The article is part of a project run by ​​The Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Go the institute's website to access the article.​</p></a>
Allers, Robin. 2016. "The framework nation: can Germany lead on security?" International Affairs 92 (5)Allers, Robin. 2016. "The framework nation: can Germany lead on security?" International Affairs 92 (5)<p class="forsvaretElement-p">​​​Can Germany lead on security? This article aims to address this question by looking at recent German contributions to European defence cooperation. In 2013 Germany introduced the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) as a systematic and structured approach towards joint capability development. The concept relies on the idea that bigger nations take the overall responsibility for coordinating the contributions of smaller partners in a capability package. </p><p class="forsvaretElement-p">The framework nation model as such is not new but the initiative has been welcomed as a potential game changer in European defence cooperation and as confirmation of Germany's commitment to NATO. In light of the Ukraine crisis, measures to adapt NATO and to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance have become more urgent. Allies and partners increasingly want Germany to extend its role as Europe's dominant economic and financial power to matters of security and defence. </p><p class="forsvaretElement-p">The framework nation model allows Germany to take international responsibility, while avoiding debates about leadership and hegemony. Moreover, as a framework nation, Germany can advance flexible cooperation among a smaller number of allies without undermining its commitment to multilateralism. But the FNC initiative also raises further questions: what is the added value of the framework nation model compared to similar formats; what should be the place of smaller groupings in the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture; and how reliable is Germany in the role of a lead nation?</p><p class="forsvaretElement-p"><a href="">Read the article in full text.</a></p><p class="forsvaretElement-p">Hvis du mangler tilgang: kontakt Forsvarets høgskolens bibliotek: <a href=""></a></p><p><br></p>
Bruusgaard, Kristin Ven. 2016. "Russian Strategic Deterrence". Survival 54 (4)Bruusgaard, Kristin Ven. 2016. "Russian Strategic Deterrence". Survival 54 (4)<p>​​​Russia's intention to conduct a Ukraine-style hybrid operation against a NATO country is uncertain, but its determination to deter NATO from encroaching on Russia's security interests is clear.</p><p>Although many Western analysts are preoccupied with the likelihood of Russia plotting 'hybrid warfare' operations against NATO members, the concept itself is not an explicit part of Russian military doctrine. For Russian analysts, hybrid warfare is a Western construct. A reading of Russian military–theoretical debates shows a preoccupation with a broader concept, which can be termed strategic deterrence (<em>strategicheskoe sderzhivanie</em>). This Russian concept is part of official doctrine and strategy, and understanding it is crucial to analysing current and future Russian security and defence policy.</p><p>Strategic deterrence is the indigenous concept that encompasses what others call Russia's 'hybrid warfare doctrine', Russia's 'ability for cross-domain coercion' and Russia's 'nuclear brinkmanship'. The Russian concept, which can be translated as 'strategic deterrence', is conceived much more broadly than the traditional Western concept of deterrence. It is not entirely defensive: it contains offensive and defensive, nuclear, non-nuclear and non-military deterrent tools. These are to be used in times of peace and war – making the concept resemble, to Western eyes, a combined strategy of containment, deterrence and coercion – using all means available to deter or dominate conflict. Strategic deterrence provides a guide to how Russia may seek to influence any potential adversary, including NATO, in the future. Russia's intention to conduct a Ukraine-style hybrid-warfare operation against a NATO country is uncertain; its intention to deter NATO from encroaching on Russia's security interests is not.</p><p>The strategic-deterrence concept sheds light on the future division of labour between Russia's conventional and nuclear weapons, challenging the Western assumption that Russian nuclear weapons continue to have an elevated role in Russian strategy. It depicts de-escalation as just one part of Russian deterrence thinking, and one that may be sought with the use of tools other than nuclear weapons. And it provides details on how non-military and military tools are combined in order to influence a potential adversary's assessment of Russia. This article seeks to understand what it means when official Russian documents state that 'Russia's strategic goals and defense policy will be realized through the use of strategic deterrence'.</p><p>This article is based on insights from debates in Russian military theoretical journals, primarily <em>Military Thought</em>, the official journal of the Russian General Staff. The main contributors to this journal are senior officers and military academics, as well as some key members of the country's military leadership, including former chiefs of General Staff. Although the debates in this journal do not reflect classified elements of Russian military strategy, they are likely to reflect the most pressing issues in Russian defence policy.​</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="box-sizing:content-box;margin-bottom:1.875em;font-size:16px;line-height:26px;color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;background-color:#ffffff;">​<a href="" target="_blank" style="box-sizing:content-box;color:#877040;text-decoration:underline;transition:0.3s;background:transparent;">To read the article, go to the Survival website</a>. </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="box-sizing:content-box;margin-bottom:1.875em;font-size:16px;line-height:26px;color:#333333;font-family:proximanova, arial, helvetica, sans-serif;background-color:#ffffff;">Kontakt Forsvarets høgskolens bibliotek hvis du mangler tilgang: <a href="" style="box-sizing:content-box;color:#877040;transition:0.3s;background:transparent;"></a></p>

 Bøker og rapporter om norsk og europeisk sikkerhet



Petersson: The US NATO Debate. From Libya to Ukraine<img alt="" src="/media/PubImages/Petersson_US_NATO%20debate_ill_ferdig.jpg" style="BORDER:0px solid;" />Petersson: The US NATO Debate. From Libya to UkraineMagnus Petersson looks at US expectations to its European allies. Do the Americans want to pull back and leave the Europeans to handle their own security challenges?
Allers, Masala&Tamnes (eds.) (2014): Common or Divided Security? <img alt="" src="/media/PubImages/Tamnes%20et%20al_common_divided_security_karu.jpg" style="BORDER:0px solid;" />Allers, Masala&Tamnes (eds.) (2014): Common or Divided Security? Where is Europe heading? Euro-Atlantic security issues from a German and Norwegian point of view.
Holtsmark (red.): Naboer i frykt og forventning<img alt="" src="/media/PubImages/Norge-Russland_seminar_ingress.jpg" style="BORDER:0px solid;" />Holtsmark (red.): Naboer i frykt og forventningDette er bind 2 i bokverket Norge og Russland 1814–2014. Boken er redigert av Sven G. Holtsmark.

 Ansatte ved Senter for norsk og europeisk sikkerhet



Allers, RobinAllers, Robin
Bruusgaard, Kristin VenBruusgaard, Kristin Ven
Bækken, HåvardBækken, Håvard
Danielsen, HelgeDanielsen, Helge
Elgsaas, Ingvill MoeElgsaas, Ingvill Moe
Gade, Jo GeorgGade, Jo Georg
Godal, Bjørn ToreGodal, Bjørn Toreørn-tore
Hilde, Paal SigurdHilde, Paal Sigurd
Kristiansen, Tom Kristiansen, Tom
Offerdal, Kristine Offerdal, Kristine
Opdahl, Ingerid M.Opdahl, Ingerid M.
Parnemo, Liv KarinParnemo, Liv Karin
Tamnes, RolfTamnes, Rolf
Zysk, KatarzynaZysk, Katarzyna
Østhagen, AndreasØsthagen, Andreas

Publisert 23. oktober 2014 14:58.. Sist oppdatert 12. oktober 2016 09:31.