Kronvall: Counterinsurgency

Oslo Files 5/2007
Finally Easting Soup with a Knife? A Historical Perspective on the US Army's 2006 Counterinsurgency Doctrine

​​

Oslo Files on defence and security no. 5/2007
Title:
Finally Easting Soup with a Knife? A Historical Perspective on the US Army's 2006 Counterinsurgency Doctrine
Author: Olof Kronvall
Pages: 53

Download "Finally Eastin​g Soup with a Knife? A Historical Perspective on the US Army's 2006 Counterinsurgency Doctrine​" 


In 2006, the US Army adopted a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, Field Manual 3-24. The doctrine establishes new guidelines for conducting operations such as those currently taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq, where its validity is being tested. It is also a turning point in the US Army’s doctrinal approach to such operations as it fully embraces the “small war” approach to COIN.

Earlier post-Vietnam Army doctrine has had an ambivalent view of the small war approach, which is contrary to the Army’s traditional preference for fighting big-scale, conventional wars. While earlier post-Vietnam COIN doctrines have used the conflicts in Vietnam and El Salvador as models, FM 3-24 takes into account many other possible forms of insurgency as well. It also recognizes more clearly the key role of popular legitimacy and accepts a potentially much more extensive degree of Army involvement. Furthermore, FM 3-24 wholeheartedly argues that political concerns should take precedence over strictly military ones when applying force. COIN operations are viewed as a long-term commitment.

The doctrine may help to fill a gap in US military capabilities, but this ultimately requires a change in the Army’s mindset and in US national strategic culture.

Publisert 1. mai 2007 15:08.. Sist oppdatert 22. juni 2015 10:41.