Emneside for OPS2203 Complex Operations

Knowledge

Upon the completion of the module, the cadets will be able to:

• Establish a broad knowledge of the most common forms of low-intensity conflicts, and how these differ from high-intensity conflicts

• Understand strengths and weaknesses in existing theories of low-intensity conflicts and how they differ from high-intensity conflicts

• Give an account of new trends and developments for land warfare

Skills

Upon the completion of the module, the cadets will be able to:

• Apply military force in contexts where actions on a tactical level might have strategic consequences

• Plan and lead operations at the tactical level within the framework of peacekeeping and counterinsurgency

General competence

Upon the completion of the module, the cadets will be able to:

• Understand the role of land forces in complex operations

• Plan and conduct operations with land forces on the tactical level within the context of complex operations

• Give an account of major trends and developments which are likely to affect the conduct of land operations on a tactical level in future operations

The module consists of four distinct parts. Part one addresses the differences between high- and low intensity warfare. Part two focuses on insurgency and counterinsurgency. Part three is devoted to peacekeeping. Part four studies the future of land warfare and the changing character of conflicts.

The theoretical part of the module utilises individual studies, cadet driven study groups, lectures and seminars. The main principle is to give the cadets as much time as possible to read, analyse and understand the different topics. Lectures are meant as an arena where the cadets can discuss the topics raised by the syllabus, or to explore specific topics more in-depth. During the seminars, the cadets have the opportunity to test and exchange knowledge with their fellow cadets, and thus expand their own and other’s knowledge. The established learning groups will act as the basis for the seminar groups. Each group are expected to produce a written summary of their seminars for the other groups to read. The cadets will run the seminars, but available instructors will observe and support.

The practical part of the module will utilise a variety of map-exercises, games and a field training exercise. The purpose of these is to give the cadets the opportunity to apply their theoretical knowledge on practical and realistic exercises.

Leader development project

The topic Military leadership and leader development (MLLU) runs throughout the bachelor's degree of which this subject is part of. The cadets work with MLLU learning projects that lead to papers that are handed in. The project work is included as a mandatory part of LED3201 Offiseren and ING3205 Ingeniøroffiseren.

• Adams, Audrey (2017). What every planner should know about Cyberspace operations. USNWCJOURNALS > MOC-WARFIGHTER > Vol. 1 > Iss. 10  (deles internt)

• Amnesty International (2016). If Men Are Caught, They Are Killed, If Women Are Caught, They Are Raped. pp 4-25.

• Annan, Kofi (1999), "Two concepts of sovereignty", The Economist (18 Sept).

• Beadle, Alexander William (2014). Protection of civilians - military planning scenarios and implications (Oslo: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt), pp 7-21, 66-67.

• Berdal, M. (2000). Lessons not learned: The use of force in ‘peace operations’ in the 1990s. International Peacekeeping, 7(4), 55-74.

• Berdal, Mats (2008), "The Security Council and Peacekeeping" in Lowe, Vaughan et.al, The United Nations Security Council and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp 175-204.   

• Clausewitz, C. V. (1976). On War, red. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Book I, chapter 1, pp 75-89.

• Crane, Conrad (2010) Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (Eds.), Understanding Counterinsurgency (pp. 59-72). London: Routledge.

• Cullen, Patrick and Njord Wegge (2019): «Å varsle om hybride trusler», i Stenslie, Stig, Lars Haugom og Brigt Harr Vaage (red): Etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

• Dalsjø, Robert et al (2019) "Bursting the Bubble - Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications". FOI. Report 4651. Stockholm. pp 9-20 and 72-79).  https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4651--SE

• Erskine, Emmanuel A (1989), Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's Reflections (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp 20-49.

• Estonian forreign intelligence service (2018) International Security and Estonia. Cyberthreats pp-52-57 raport-2018-ENG-web.pdf (valisluureamet.ee)

• Findlay, T (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp 9-49, 87-123.

• Findlay, T. (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp124-165.

• Freedman, Lawrence (ed). (1994). War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 309-351          

• French, David (2012) ’Nasty not Nice, British Counterinsurgency doctrine and practice’ Small Wars and Insurgencies (23:4-5).

• Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 1-28.

• Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 49-74.

• Giustozzi, Antonio (2007) Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. London: Hurst & Company, pp 98-133.

• Government of the Netherlands. Final Evaluation - Netherlands contribution to ISAF, 2006 - 2010 (The Hague: The Government of the Netherlands 2011) ch 3 (pp 1931) and 4.3.6 (pp 37-43).

• Greer, Jim (2017). "The Weaker Foe part 2" in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/7/11/the-weaker-foe-part-2...

• Greer, Jim (2017). "The Weaker Foe" in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/3/7/the-weaker-foe

• Hazelton, Jacqueline (2017). "The "Hearts and Minds" Fallacy - Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency warfare", International Security 42, no. 1.

• Hew Strachan (2010) Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War, Survival, 52:5, pp 157-182.

• Hoffman, Frank (2009) "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges" in Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 52, 1st Quarter.

• ICISS (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, s.xi-xiii, 1-9.

• Interview with gen Wesley. This 3-star Army general explains what multi-domain operations mean for you (armytimes.com)

• Jones, Adam (2006), "Bosnia and Kosovo", in Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge), pp 212-224.

• Kaldor, Mary, Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars and the War on Terror, lecture at London School of Economics (Feb 2005).

• Karlsrud, John and Osland, Kari M (2016), "Between self-interest and solidarity: Norway’s return to UN peacekeeping?", International Peacekeeping, 23:5, 784-803.

• Kelly, Max and Giffen, Allison (2011). Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Washington: Stimson Center), pp 13-35.

• Kilcullen, David (2010) Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 113, 29-49 and 147-161.

• Kitson Frank, (1971). Low-intensity operations, London: Faber & Faber Limited, pp 1-9.          

• Kjeksrud, Stian, Beadle, Alexander og Lindquist, Petter (2016). Protecting Civilians from violence, Oslo: FFI/ NODEFIC, pp 1-26.

• Mao Tse Tung (1978) Militærskrifter i utvalg. Oslo: Oktober forlag, pp 239-52 og 26166.

• Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence (2016). "A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014." In Official Norwegian Reports NOU. Oslo. Chapter 8, pp 121-151.

• Ofer Fridman, "Hybrid Warfare or Gribidnaya Voyna," The RUSI Journal 162, no.1 (Feb/March 2017): pp.42-49.

• Oscar (2019): The Russian understanding of war. Blurring the lines between war and peace. Washington DC: Georgetown University press, pp 1-21.

• Palazzo, Albert (2017). "Multi-Domain Battle: The Echo of the Past" in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/10/11/multi-domain-battle-...

• Porch, Douglas (2011) "The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN" i Small Wars and Insurgencies (22:2).

• Rid, T & McBurney, P (2012) Cyber-Weapons. The RUSI Journal 157 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071847.2012.664354.

• Rid, T (2012) "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 35, no 1, 5-32, Feb, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939.

• Robert Johnson, "Hybrid War and its Countermeasures: A critique of the literature," Small Wars and Insurgencies 29, no.1 (2018): pp.141-163.

• Scales, Robert (2019). "Tactical Art in Future Wars" in: War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/tactical-art-in-future-wars/

• Shy, John and Collier, Thomas "Revolutionary war" in Paret, Peter (eds) Makers of Modern Strategy - from Machiavelli to the Nuclear age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp 815-862.

• Smith, Rupert (2007). "Thinking about the utility of force in war amongst the people", in On New Wars, ed. John Andreas Olsen, pp 28-43.

• Spreckelsen (2018). Electronic Warfare - The forgotten dicipline. Joint air power competence centre. Transforming Joint Air Power: The Journal of the JAPCC vol. 27 pp.41-45 https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J27_screen.pdf#page=4.

• Stockwell, AJ (1995) British Documents on the End of Empire - Malaya part II. London: HMSO, pp 216-221.

• Taylor, Kurt and Kay, Larry (2019). "Putting the enemy between a Rock and a Hard Place: Multi-Domain Operations in Practice". Modern War Institute. West Point. Putting the Enemy Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Multi-Domain Operations in Practice - Modern War Institute (usma.edu)

• Tharoor, Shashi (1995), "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 37(4), pp 52-64.

• Thompson, Robert (1966) America Fights the Wrong War. Spectator, (217:7207).

• Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 21-49.

• Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 50-62.

• TRADOC (2018) "The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028". pp. 5-46 20181206-tp525-3-1-the-us-army-in-mdo-2028-final.pdf 

• UN Doc. UNSC Res. 425, 426 and 427.

• UN Doc. UNSC Res/1291(2000), pp 1-6.

• United Nations (1978). Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

• United Nations (1996), "UNPROFOR" in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), s. 556-563.

• United Nations (1996). "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)" in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), pp 83-85, 88-96.

• United Nations (2000), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], pp 9-12, 14-20.

• United Nations (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines. pp13-40, 47-52.

• US Army & US Marine Corps (2006). Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (FM 3-24) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp xxi-xliii (Seawalls foreword added separately), pnt 1-52, pnts 7-1 - 7-25,  pnts 7-45 - 7-48. NOTE: required reading is marked in paragraph points, NOT pages.

• USMC (1940). Small Wars, Washington: United States government printing officer, pp 1 and 11-16.

Form of assessment: The students are required to write an essay of 3,500 words during the module. Questions for the essay will be handed out at the start and the students are expected to hand in their essay at the end of the module. The essay will be graded A-F and will count for 100% of the grade in the module.

Duration: 12 weeks

Grading scale: A-F

Due to the Covid19 pandemic in the spring of 2020, all subjects at FHS were switched to distributed / digitized teaching. This lasted until May 7, when some subjects and student groups gained some more access to physical / regular teaching. Exercise Hammarskjöld were changed from an FTX to CPX (web based).

The module consists of four distinct parts. Part one addresses the differences between high- and low intensity warfare. Part two focuses on peacekeeping. Part three is devoted to counterinsurgency. Part four studies the future of land power and the changing character of conflicts.

The module utilises different pedagogic strategies. The parts which focus on theory will have ample time to study relevant texts, lectures and seminargroups where key topics and questions are discussed. Parts two and three will include map or table-top exercises, computer simulation exercises, and field exercises where students are challenged to transform theoretical knowledge into practical actions.

The module will conclude with a seminar on future land operations.