Emneside for OPS2203 Complex Operations

Knowledge

Upon completion of the module the students will be able to:

• Have knowledge of significance and prevalence of low-intensity and complex conflicts, and how these differ conceptually from and relate to high-intensity conflicts. 

• Have broad knowledge of the main academic and military theories of irregular warfare, peacekeeping and insurgency/counterinsurgency operations.

•  Have knowledge of the role of land forces in low intensity and complex operations.

• Are familiar with the historical development of the study of low intensity operations and its place in the wider field of strategic and military studies.

Skills

Upon completion of the module the students will be able to:

• Can apply knowledge of low-intensity operations and analyse, find and evaluate challenges concerning low intensity and complex operations, and present well-founded solutions as part of an MDM-process.

General competence

Upon completion of the module the students will be able to:

• Can plan and lead military operations, as a leader or member of a staff at the tactical level, within the framework of peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operations.

• Can convey central elements and aspects of low intensity and complex operations to political and civilian actors.

• Can exchange opinions and experiences with others with a background in the field of low intensity operations.

The course consists of three parts. Initially the course addresses the differences between high- and low intensity warfare, as well as irregular and complex conflicts. Part two is devoted to insurgency and counterinsurgency with an emphasis on understanding the premise, practice and criticism of population centric counterinsurgency. Part three focuses on peacekeeping operations, its inception and its four stages of development. A particular attention will be given to protection of civilians.

The academic parts of the course utilize individual studies, cadet-driven study groups, lectures and seminars. The curriculum, and understanding the ideas and logic encompassed within it, is the key to the course. The main principle is to give the cadets as much time as possible to read, analyze and understand the different topics. Lectures are an arena where the cadets can discuss the topics raised by the syllabus, or to explore specific topics in-depth. During the seminars, the cadets have the opportunity to test and exchange knowledge with their fellow cadets, and thus expand each other's knowledge. The seminars require that the cadets are prepared and that they are able to convey the main ideas of each piece of the curriculum to their fellow cadets, including an introduction of the overall thematic on the week's required reading. The cadets run the seminars, but instructors will support if needed.

The practical parts of the module will utilize a variety of map-excercises, war-games and a field training exercise. The purpose of these is to give the cadets the opportunity to apply their theoretical knowledge on practical and realistic exercises.

• Adams, Audrey (2017). What every planner should know about Cyberspace operations. USNWCJOURNALS > MOC-WARFIGHTER > Vol. 1 > Iss. 10 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&conte....

• Amnesty International (2016). If Men Are Caught, They Are Killed, If Women Are Caught, They Are Raped. pp 4-25.

• Annan, Kofi (1999), "Two concepts of sovereignty", The Economist (18 Sept).

• Beadle, Alexander William (2014). Protection of civilians - military planning scenarios and implications (Oslo: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt), pp 7-21, 66-67.

• Berdal, M. (2000). Lessons not learned: The use of force in ‘peace operations’ in the 1990s. International Peacekeeping, 7(4), 55-74.

• Berdal, Mats (2008), "The Security Council and Peacekeeping" in Lowe, Vaughan et.al, The United Nations Security Council and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp 175-204.   

• Clausewitz, C. V. (1976). On War, red. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Book I, chapter 1, pp 75-89.

• Crane, Conrad (2010) Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (Eds.), Understanding Counterinsurgency (pp. 59-72). London: Routledge.

• Cullen, Patrick and Njord Wegge (2019): «Å varsle om hybride trusler», i Stenslie, Stig, Lars Haugom og Brigt Harr Vaage (red): Etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

• Dalsjø, Robert et al (2019) "Bursting the Bubble - Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications". FOI. Report 4651. Stockholm. pp 9-20 and 72-79).  https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4651--SE

• Erskine, Emmanuel A (1989), Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's Reflections (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp 20-49.

•  Estonian forreign intelligence service (2018) International Security and Estonia. Cyberthreats pp-52-57 https://www.valisluureamet.ee/pdf/raport-2018-ENGweb.pdf#page=54.

• Findlay, T (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp 9-49, 87-123.

• Findlay, T. (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp124-165.

• Freedman, Lawrence (ed). (1994). War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 309-351          

• French, David (2012) ’Nasty not Nice, British Counterinsurgency doctrine and practice’ Small Wars and Insurgencies (23:4-5).

• Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 1-28.

• Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 49-74.

• Giustozzi, Antonio (2007) Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. London: Hurst & Company, pp 98-133.

• Government of the Netherlands. Final Evaluation - Netherlands contribution to ISAF, 2006 - 2010 (The Hague: The Government of the Netherlands 2011) ch 3 (pp 1931) and 4.3.6 (pp 37-43).

• Greer, Jim (2017). "The Weaker Foe part 2" in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/7/11/the-weaker-foe-part-2...

• Greer, Jim (2017). "The Weaker Foe" in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/3/7/the-weaker-foe

• Hazelton, Jacqueline (2017). "The "Hearts and Minds" Fallacy - Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency warfare", International Security 42, no. 1.

• Hew Strachan (2010) Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War, Survival, 52:5, pp 157-182.

• Hoffman, Frank (2009) "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges" in Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 52, 1st Quarter.

• ICISS (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, s.xi-xiii, 1-9.

• Interview with gen Wesley. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/08/11/this-3-star-army-gen...

• Jones, Adam (2006), "Bosnia and Kosovo", in Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge), pp 212-224.

• Kaldor, Mary, Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars and the War on Terror, lecture at London School of Economics (Feb 2005).

• Karlsrud, John and Osland, Kari M (2016), "Between self-interest and solidarity: Norway’s return to UN peacekeeping?", International Peacekeeping, 23:5, 784-803.

• Kelly, Max and Giffen, Allison (2011). Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Washington: Stimson Center), pp 13-35.

• Kilcullen, David (2010) Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 113, 29-49 and 147-161.

• Kitson Frank, (1971). Low-intensity operations, London: Faber & Faber Limited, pp 1-9.          

• Kjeksrud, Stian, Beadle, Alexander og Lindquist, Petter (2016). Protecting Civilians from violence, Oslo: FFI/ NODEFIC, pp 1-26.

• Mao Tse Tung (1978) Militærskrifter i utvalg. Oslo: Oktober forlag, pp 239-52 og 26166.

• Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence (2016). "A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014." In Official Norwegian Reports NOU. Oslo. Chapter 8, pp 121-151.

• Ofer Fridman, "Hybrid Warfare or Gribidnaya Voyna," The RUSI Journal 162, no.1 (Feb/March 2017): pp.42-49.

• Oscar (2019): The Russian understanding of war. Blurring the lines between war and peace. Washington DC: Georgetown University press, pp 1-21.

• Palazzo, Albert (2017). "Multi-Domain Battle: The Echo of the Past" in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/10/11/multi-domain-battle-...

• Porch, Douglas (2011) "The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN" i Small Wars and Insurgencies (22:2).

• Rid, T & McBurney, P (2012) Cyber-Weapons. The RUSI Journal 157 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071847.2012.664354.

• Rid, T (2012) "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 35, no 1, 5-32, Feb, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939.

• Robert Johnson, "Hybrid War and its Countermeasures: A critique of the literature," Small Wars and Insurgencies 29, no.1 (2018): pp.141-163.

• Scales, Robert (2019). "Tactical Art in Future Wars" in: War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/tactical-art-in-future-wars/

• Shy, John and Collier, Thomas "Revolutionary war" in Paret, Peter (eds) Makers of Modern Strategy - from Machiavelli to the Nuclear age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp 815-862.

• Smith, Rupert (2007). "Thinking about the utility of force in war amongst the people", in On New Wars, ed. John Andreas Olsen, pp 28-43.

• Spreckelsen (2018). Electronic Warfare - The forgotten dicipline. Joint air power competence centre. Transforming Joint Air Power: The Journal of the JAPCC vol. 27 pp.41-45 https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J27_screen.pdf#page=4.

• Stockwell, AJ (1995) British Documents on the End of Empire - Malaya part II. London: HMSO, pp 216-221.

• Taylor, Kurt and Kay, Larry (2019). "Putting the enemy between a Rock and a Hard Place: Multi-Domain Operations in Practice". Modern War Institute. West Point. https://mwi.usma.edu/putting-enemy-rock-hard-place-multi-domain-operatio...

• Tharoor, Shashi (1995), "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 37(4), pp 52-64.

• Thompson, Robert (1966) America Fights the Wrong War. Spectator, (217:7207).

• Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 21-49.

• Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 50-62.

• TRADOC (2018) "The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028". pp. 5-46 https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-31_30Nov2018.pdf

• UN Doc. UNSC Res. 425, 426 and 427.

• UN Doc. UNSC Res/1291(2000), pp 1-6.

• United Nations (1978). Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

• United Nations (1996), "UNPROFOR" in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), s. 556-563.

• United Nations (1996). "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)" in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), pp 83-85, 88-96.

• United Nations (2000), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], pp 9-12, 14-20.

• United Nations (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines. pp13-40, 47-52.

• US Army & US Marine Corps (2006). Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (FM 3-24) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp xxi-xliii (Seawalls foreword added separately), pnt 1-52, pnts 7-1 - 7-25,  pnts 7-45 - 7-48. NOTE: required reading is marked in paragraph points, NOT pages.

• USMC (1940). Small Wars, Washington: United States government printing officer, pp 1 and 11-16.

•  

• Adams, Audrey (2017). What every planner should know about Cyberspace operations. USNWCJOURNALS > MOC-WARFIGHTER > Vol. 1 > Iss. 10 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=moc-warfighter

• Amnesty International (2016). If Men Are Caught, They Are Killed, If Women Are Caught, They Are Raped. pp 4-25.   

• Annan, Kofi (1999), "Two concepts of sovereignty", The Economist (18 Sept).

• Beadle, Alexander William (2014). Protection of civilians - military planning scenarios and implications (Oslo: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt), pp 7-21, 66-67.

• Berdal, M. (2000). Lessons not learned: The use of force in ‘peace operations’ in the 1990s. International Peacekeeping, 7(4), 55-74.

• Berdal, Mats (2008), "The Security Council and Peacekeeping" in Lowe, Vaughan et.al, The United Nations Security Council and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp 175-204.

• Clausewitz, C. V. (1976). On War, red. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Book I, chapter 1, pp 75-89.

• Crane, Conrad (2010) Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (Eds.), Understanding Counterinsurgency (pp. 59-72). London: Routledge.

• Cullen, Patrick and Njord Wegge (2019): «Å varsle om hybride trusler», i Stenslie, Stig, Lars Haugom og Brigt Harr Vaage (red): Etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

• Dalsjø, Robert et al (2019) "Bursting the Bubble - Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications". FOI. Report 4651. Stockholm. pp 9-20 and 72-79). 

https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4651--SE

• Erskine, Emmanuel A (1989), Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's Reflections (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp 20-49.   

• Estonian forreign intelligence service (2018) International Security and Estonia. Cyberthreats pp-52-57 https://www.valisluureamet.ee/pdf/raport-2018-ENG-web.pdf#page=54

• Findlay, T (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp 9-49, 87-123

• Findlay, T. (2002). The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. (New York: Oxford University Press.), pp124-165.

• Freedman, Lawrence (ed). (1994). War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 309-351

• French, David (2012) ’Nasty not Nice, British Counterinsurgency doctrine and practice’ Small Wars and Insurgencies (23:4-5)

• Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 1-28.                                                                                                                    (27p)

• Galula, David (2008) Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice. Westport: Praeger, pp 49-74.

• Giustozzi, Antonio (2007) Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. London: Hurst & Company, pp 98-133.

• Government of the Netherlands. Final Evaluation - Netherlands contribution to ISAF, 2006 - 2010 (The Hague: The Government of the Netherlands 2011) ch 3 (pp 19-31) and 4.3.6 (pp 37-43).

• Greer, Jim (2017). "The Weaker Foe part 2" in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/7/11/the-weaker-foe-part-2-transforming-the-army-to-win-as-the-near-peer-competitor?rq=multi%20domain%20battle

• Greer, Jim (2017). "The Weaker Foe" in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/3/7/the-weaker-foe

• Hazelton, Jacqueline (2017). "The "Hearts and Minds" Fallacy - Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency warfare", International Security 42, no. 1

• Hew Strachan (2010) Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War, Survival, 52:5,  pp 157-182   

• Hoffman, Frank (2009) "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges" in Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 52, 1st Quarter.

•  

•  

• ICISS (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, s.xi-xiii, 1-9.

• Interview with gen Wesley.

• Johnson, Oscar (2019): The Russian understanding of war. Blurring the lines between war and peace. Washington DC: Georgetown University press, pp 1-21.

• Jones, Adam (2006), "Bosnia and Kosovo", in Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge), pp 212-224.

• Kaldor, Mary, Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars and the War on Terror, lecture at London School of Economics (Feb 2005).

• Karlsrud, John and Osland, Kari M (2016), "Between self-interest and solidarity: Norway’s return to UN peacekeeping?", International Peacekeeping, 23:5, 784-803.

• Kelly, Max and Giffen, Allison (2011). Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Washington: Stimson Center), pp 13-35.

• Kilcullen, David (2010) Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 1-13, 29-49 and 147-161

• Kitson Frank, (1971). Low-intensity operations, London: Faber & Faber Limited, pp 1-9.

• Kjeksrud, Stian, Beadle, Alexander og Lindquist, Petter (2016). Protecting Civilians from violence, Oslo: FFI/ NODEFIC, pp 1-26.

• Mao Tse Tung (1978) Militærskrifter i utvalg. Oslo: Oktober forlag, pp 239-52 og 261-66.

• Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence (2016). "A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014." In Official Norwegian Reports NOU. Oslo. Chapter 8, pp 121-151

• Ofer Fridman, "Hybrid Warfare or Gribidnaya Voyna," The RUSI Journal 162, no.1 (Feb/March 2017): pp.42-49. 

• Palazzo, Albert (2017). "Multi-Domain Battle: The Echo of the Past" in The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/10/11/multi-domain-battle-the-echo-of-the-past?rq=multi%20domain%20battle

• Porch, Douglas (2011) "The dangerous myths and dubious promise of COIN" i Small Wars and Insurgencies (22:2)

• Rid, T & McBurney, P (2012) Cyber-Weapons. The RUSI Journal 157 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071847.2012.664354 

• Rid, T (2012) "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 35, no 1, 5-32, Feb, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939

• Robert Johnson, "Hybrid War and its Countermeasures: A critique of the literature," Small Wars and Insurgencies 29, no.1 (2018): pp.141-163                                 

• Scales, Robert (2019). "Tactical Art in Future Wars" in: War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/tactical-art-in-future-wars/

• Shy, John and Collier, Thomas "Revolutionary war" in Paret, Peter (eds) Makers of Modern Strategy - from Machiavelli to the Nuclear age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp 815-862.    

• Smith, Rupert (2007). "Thinking about the utility of force in war amongst the people", in On New Wars, ed. John Andreas Olsen, pp 28-43.

• Spreckelsen (2018). Electronic Warfare - The forgotten dicipline. Joint air power competence centre. Transforming Joint Air Power: The Journal of the JAPCC vol. 27 pp.41-45 https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J27_screen.pdf#page=4

• Stockwell, AJ (1995) British Documents on the End of Empire - Malaya part II. London: HMSO, pp 216-221    

• Taylor, Kurt and Kay, Larry (2019). "Putting the enemy between a Rock and a Hard Place: Multi-Domain Operations in Practice". Modern War Institute. West Point.https://mwi.usma.edu/putting-enemy-rock-hard-place-multi-domain-operations-practice/

• Tharoor, Shashi (1995), "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 37(4), pp 52-64.

• The initiation of UNIFILhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXIVvOoZ2Jk

• The SUEZ crisis and the background for UNEF I. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBNIrYU5G3M

• Thompson, Robert (1966) America Fights the Wrong War. Spectator, (217:7207)

• Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 21-49.

• Thompson, Robert (2005) Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, pp 50-62.

• TRADOC (2018) "The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028". pp. 1-46

• UN Doc. UNSC Res/1291(2000), pp 1-6.                                               

• UN Doc. UNSC Res. 425, 426 and 427.

• United Nations (1978). Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978). 

• United Nations (1996), "UNPROFOR" in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), s. 556-563.

• United Nations (1996). "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)" in The Blue Helmets. (New York: UN Department of Public Information), pp 83-85, 88-96.

• United Nations (2000), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], pp 9-12, 14-20.

• United Nations (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines. pp13-40, 47-52.

• US Army & US Marine Corps (2006). Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (FM 3-24) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp xxi-xliii (Seawalls foreword added separately), pnt 1-52, pnts 7-1 - 7-25,  pnts 7-45 - 7-48. NOTE: required reading is marked in paragraph points, NOT pages.

• USMC (1940). Small Wars, Washington: United States government printing officer, pp 1 and 11-16.

The students are required to write an essay of maximum 2,500 words during the module. Questions for the essay will be handed out at the start of the course and will cover the various module topics. The students are expected to hand in their essay at the end of the module. The essay will be graded A-F and will count as 100% of the module grade.

Subjects at NDUC are evaluated regularly as part of the university college quality system. Student evaluations are part of this work and the cadets will be asked to participate in evaluation of the subject after the fulfillment of its tuition and assessment.