Emneside for MILM2701 Analyse og etterretningsdialog

Kunnskaper

Studenten…

• har bred kunnskap om hvordan etterretningsanalyse utøves til støtte for sivile og militære beslutningstakere.
• har bred kunnskap om ulike typer av etterretningsproblemer og analytiske utfordringer.
• har bred kunnskap om ulike strukturerte analyseteknikker og deres respektive formål, herunder å øke bearbeidingsprosessens sporbarhet og integritet samt stimulerer kritisk og kreativ tenkning.
• har bred kunnskap om usikkerheten knyttet til etterretningsanalyse generelt og fremtidsestimater spesielt.
• har bred kunnskap om ulike syn på forholdet mellom etterretningsanalytiker og beslutningstaker.
• har bred kunnskap om prinsippene rettidighet, pålitelighet og relevans samt utfordringene opp imot etterretningsdialogen.
• har grunnleggende kunnskap om militære stabsfunksjoner, militære plan- og beslutningsprosesser og militære operasjoner.

Ferdigheter

Studenten…

• kan utføre oppdragsanalyse for bearbeiding og produksjon av etterretningsprodukter.
• kan selvstendig og som del av en analysegruppe anvende og integrere relevante strukturerte analyseteknikker for å gjennomføre etterretningsanalyse i komplekse scenarier.
• kan bidra til å utarbeide etterretningsprodukter til støtte for plan- og beslutningsprosessen i militære staber.
• kan håndtere og uttrykke usikkerhet i etterretningsprodukter samt skille mellom sannsynlighet og konfidens.
• kan formidle etterretningsprodukter både skriftlig og muntlig.
• kan reflektere kritisk over metodiske valg, analytiske prosesser og etterretningsprodukters kvalitet.
• kan identifisere utfordringer i forholdet mellom etterretningsanalytiker og beslutningstaker.

Generell kompetanse

Studenten…

• kan i rollen som flerdisiplinanalytiker bidra til produksjonen og formidlingen av analytiske produkter som har til hensikt å løse etterretningsproblemer i komplekse scenarier.
• kan formulere kvalitetsfremmende tiltak i bearbeidingsprosessen og begrunne disse faglig.
• kan reflektere kritisk over etterretningsanalytikerens rolle og forpliktelser generelt og i bearbeidings- og formidlingsprosessen spesielt.
• kan reflektere kritisk over utfordringer i forholdet mellom etterretningsanalytiker og beslutningstaker.

Arbeidsformene består av individuelle forberedelser, leksjoner, gruppearbeid, skriftlige innleveringer, studentpresentasjoner, gruppediskusjoner og praksis.

Pensum består av artikler og utdrag fra akademiske bøker, samt fagdokumenter som militære doktriner, og utgjør ca. 1500-1700 sider. Pensum vil kunne revideres av emneansvarlig med bakgrunn i nye publikasjoner eller utvikling på fagområdet. Enkelte elementer kan derfor bli lagt til eller erstattet med annen tilsvarende litteratur. En pensumliste presenteres for studentene i starten av det aktuelle semesteret. Gjeldende pensumliste i dette emnet:

Andrew, C. M. (2020). American presidents and their intelligence communities. I C. M. Andrew, R. J. Aldrich & W. K. Wark (Red.), Secret intelligence: A reader (2. utg., s. 138-150). Routledge. [13 sider]

Bar-Joseph, U. & McDermott, R. (2010). The intelligence analysis crisis. I L. K. Johnson (Red.), The Oxford handbook of national security intelligence (s. 359-374). Oxford University Press. [16 sider]

Ben-Haim, Y. (2022). What strategic analysts and planners for national security need to know. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 35(1), 57-72. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.1822101 [16 sider]

Betts, R. K. (1988). Policy‐makers and intelligence analysts: Love, hate or indifference? Intelligence and National Security, 3(1), 184-189. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431934 [6 sider]

Betts, R. K. (2003). Politicization of intelligence: Costs and benefits, I R. K. Betts & T. G. Mahnken (Red.), Paradoxes of strategic intelligence: Essays in honor of Michael I. Handel (s. 57-76). Routledge. [20 sider]

Borg, L. C. (2017). Improving intelligence analysis: Harnessing intuition and reducing biases by means of structured methodology. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 19(1), 2-22. https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2017.1289747 [21 sider]

Christensen, M. M., Haugegaard, R. & Linnet, P. M. (2014). War amongst the people and the absent enemy: Towards a cultural paradigm shift? Royal Danish Defence College.  https://pure.fak.dk/files/5947775/War_amongst_the_people.pdf [19 sider]

Clark, R. M. (2023). Intelligence analysis: A target-centric approach (7. utg.). CQ Press. [Kapittel 4-5, 7-8, 10-11, 13-14, 16-17, 22; totalt 220 sider]

Claver, A. & van de Meeberg, H. M. (2021). Devil’s Advocacy within Dutch military intelligence (2008-2020): An effective instrument for quality assurance? Intelligence and National Security, 36(6), 849-862. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1946951 [14 sider]

Coulthart, S. (2016). Why do analysts use structured analytic techniques? An in-depth study of an American intelligence agency. Intelligence and National Security, 31(7), 933-948. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1140327  [16 sider]

Coulthart, S. (2017). What's the problem? Frameworks and methods from policy analysis for analyzing complex problems. Intelligence and National Security, 32(5), 636-648. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310983 [13 sider]

Davis, J. (1992). The Kent-Kendall debate of 1949. Studies in Intelligence, 35(2), 91-103. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/1992-2/the-kent-kendall-debate-of-1949/ [13 sider]

Dhami, M. K. (2018). Towards an evidence-based approach to communicating uncertainty in intelligence analysis. Intelligence and National Security, 33(2), 257-272. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1394252 [16 sider]

Dhami, M. K. & Careless, K. (2019). Intelligence analysts’ strategies for solving analytic tasks. Military Psychology, 31(2), 117-127. https://doi.org/10.1080/08995605.2018.1561105 [11 sider]

Dyson, S. B. & Duelfer, C. A. (2020). Assessing how the U.S. intelligence community analyzes foreign leaders. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 33(4), 768-796. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.1733544 [29 sider]

Friedman, J. A. & Zeckhauser, R. (2014). Handling and mishandling estimative probability: Likelihood, confidence, and the search for Bin Laden. Intelligence and National Security, 30(1), 77-99. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.885202  [23 sider]

Gardiner, K. L. (2020). Squaring the circle: Dealing with intelligence-policy. I C. M. Andrew, R. J. Aldrich & W. K. Wark (Red.), Secret intelligence: A reader (2. utg., s. 151-162). Routledge. [12 sider]

Gates, R. (1992). Guarding against politicization. Studies in Intelligence, 36(1), 5-13. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/1992-2/guarding-against-politicization/ [9 sider]

Gustafson, K. C. (2019). Å gjøre langsiktige prediksjoner. I S. Stenslie, L. Haugom & B. H. Vaage (Red.), Etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid: En innføring (s. 131-149). Fagbokforlaget. [19 sider]

Hare, N. P. & Collinson, P. (2012). Organisational culture and intelligence analysis: A perspective from senior managers in the Defence Intelligence Assessments Staff. Public Policy and Administration, 28(2), 214-229. https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076712460715 [16 sider]

Hendrickson, N. (2018). Reasoning for intelligence analysts: A multidimensional approach of traits, techniques, and targets. Rowman & Littlefield. [Kapittel 16-17, 20, 29-31; totalt 44 sider]

Irwin, D. & Mandel, D. R. (2019). Improving information evaluation for intelligence production. Intelligence and National Security, 34(4), 503-525. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1569343 [23 sider]

Isaksen, B. G. M. & McNaught, K. R. (2019). Uncertainty handling in estimative intelligence: Challenges and requirements from both analyst and consumer perspectives. Journal of Risk Research, 22(5), 643-657. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1474245 [15 sider]

Isaksen, B. G. M. & McNaught, K. R. (2023). Towards a better framework for estimative intelligence: Addressing quality through a systematic approach to uncertainty handling. Intelligence and National Security, 38(7), 1127-1150. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2216963 [24 sider]

Jackson, P. (2010). On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence. I L. K. Johnson (Red.), The Oxford handbook of national security intelligence (s. 452-471). Oxford University Press. [20 sider]

Kendall, W. (1949). Review: The function of intelligence. World Politics, 1(4), 542-552. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2008837 [11 sider]

Kent, S. (1966). Strategic intelligence for American world policy. Princeton University Press. [Kapittel 11; totalt 27 sider]

Kleinsmith, E. (2020). Intelligence operations: Understanding data, tools, people, and processes. Cognella. [Side 30-41, 89-91, 188-191, 218-220, 259-282; totalt 45 sider]

Lowenthal, M. M. (2010). The policymaker-intelligence relationship. I L. K. Johnson (Red.), The Oxford handbook of national security intelligence (s. 437-451). Oxford University Press. [15 sider]

Mandel, D. R. & Irwin, D. (2021). Uncertainty, intelligence, and national security decisionmaking. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 34(3), 558-582. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.1809056 [25 sider]

Mandel, D. R. & Irwin, D. (2024). Beyond bias minimization: Improving intelligence with optimization and human augmentation. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 37(2), 649-665. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2253120 [17 sider]

Marrin, S. (2011). Improving intelligence analysis: Bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Routledge. [173 sider]

Marrin, S. (2012). Is intelligence analysis an art or a science? International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 25(3), 529-545. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2012.678690 [17 sider]

Marrin, S. (2017). Why strategic intelligence analysis has limited influence on American foreign policy. Intelligence and National Security, 32(6), 725-742. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1275139 [18 sider]

Marrin, S. (2020). Analytic objectivity and science: Evaluating the US intelligence community’s approach to applied epistemology. Intelligence and National Security, 35(3), 350-366. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1710806 [17 sider]

McFate, M. (2005). The military utility of understanding adversary culture. Joint Forces Quarterly, (38), 42-48. [7 sider]

Medina, C. A. (2002). What to do when traditional models fail: The coming revolution in intelligence analysis. Studies in Intelligence, 46(3). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/volume-46-no-3/what-to-do-when-traditional-models-fail/ [10 sider]

Menkved, C. (2021). Understanding the complexity of intelligence problems. Intelligence and National Security, 36(5), 621-641. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1881865 [21 sider]

Moore, D. T. (2007). Critical thinking and intelligence analysis. National Defense Intelligence College. [side 2, 8-19; totalt 13 sider]

Moore, D. T. (2015). A short primer on deception and what to do about It. American Intelligence Journal, 32(2), 3-12. [10 sider]

Moore, D. T., Moore, E., Cantey, S. & Hoffman, R. R. (2021). Sensemaking for 21st century intelligence. Journal of Intelligence History, 20(1), 45-59. https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2020.1746143 [15 sider]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Office (2019). Allied intelligence publication 17: Joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment (utg. A, v. 1). [Kapittel 1-4; totalt 63 sider]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Office (2019). Allied joint publication 5: Allied joint doctrine for the planning of operations (utg. A, v. 2). [Kapittel 3 samt anneks B; totalt 26 sider]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Office (2020). Allied intelligence publication 18: Intelligence processing (utg. A, v. 1). [Kapittel 2; totalt 11 sider]

Omand, D. (2020). Reflections on intelligence analysts and policymakers. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 33(3), 471-482. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.1754679 [12 sider]

Pherson, R. H. & Heuer, R. J. (2021). Structured analytic techniques for intelligence analysis (3. utg.). CQ Press. [Kapittel 1-4, 8 samt avsnitt 6.3, 6.8, 7.1-7.2, 7.4.2, 7.6, 7.8-7.9, 9.6-9.8, 9.11, 10.1, 10.3-10.4, 10.6, 10.9; totalt 216 sider]

Phythian, M. (2017). Intelligence analysis and social science methods: Exploring the potential for and possible limits of mutual learning. Intelligence and National Security, 32(5), 600-612. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310972 [13 sider]

Pillar, P. R. (2010). The perils of politicization. I L. K. Johnson (Red.), The Oxford handbook of national security intelligence (s. 472-484). Oxford University Press. [13 sider]

Rasmussen, L. J., Sieck, W. R. & Hoffman, R. R. (2013). Cultural Knowledge for Intelligence Analysts: Expertise in Cultural Sensemaking. American Intelligence Journal, 31(2), 28-37. [10 sider]

Rovner, J. (2020). Is politicization ever a good thing? I C. M. Andrew, R. J. Aldrich & W. K. Wark (Red.), Secret intelligence: A reader (2. utg., s. 125-137). Routledge. [13 sider]

Rønn, K. V. (2014). (Mis-) informed decisions? On epistemic reasonability of intelligence claims. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 27(2), 351-367. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.842813 [17 sider]

Rønn, K. V. (2022). The multifaceted norm of objectivity in intelligence practices. Intelligence and National Security, 37(6), 820-834. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2022.2076331 [15 sider]

Speigel, I. (2021). Adopting and improving a new forecasting paradigm. Intelligence and National Security, 36(7), 961-977. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1946955 [17 sider]

Spencer, E. (2009). It’s all about the people: Cultural intelligence (CQ) as a force multiplier in the contemporary operating environment. Journal of Conflict Studies, 29, 96-106. https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/15235 [11 sider]

Stromer-Galley, J., Rossini, P., Kenski, K., McKernan, B., Clegg, B., Folkestad, J., Østerlund, C.,  Schooler, L., Boichak, O., Canzonetta, J., Martey, R. M., Pavlich, C.,Tsetsi, E. & McCracken, N. (2021). Flexible versus structured support for reasoning: Enhancing analytical reasoning through a flexible analytic technique. Intelligence and National Security, 36(2), 279-298. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1841466 [20 sider]

University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (2019). The red team handbook: The army’s guide to making better decisions (v. 9.0). [Side 79-80, 107-108, 169-170, 183-186; totalt 10 sider]

Vandepeer, C. (2014). Applied thinking for intelligence analysis: A guide for practitioners. Air Power Development Centre. [Kapittel 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 samt side 91-93; totalt 46 sider]

Vandepeer, C. (2018). Intelligence and knowledge development: What are the questions intelligence analysts ask? Intelligence and National Security, 33(6), 785-803. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1454029 [19 sider]

Vogel, K. M., Reid, G., Kampe, C. & Jones, P. (2021). The impact of AI on intelligence analysis: Tackling issues of collaboration, algorithmic transparency, accountability, and management. Intelligence and National Security, 36(6), 827-848. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1946952 [22 sider]

Whitesmith, M. (2019). The efficacy of ACH in mitigating serial position effects and confirmation bias in an intelligence analysis scenario, Intelligence and NationalSecurity, 34(2), 225-242. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1534640 [18 sider]

Woodard, N. (2013). Tasting the forbidden fruit: Unlocking the potential of positive politicization. Intelligence and National Security, 28(1), 91-108. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.749066 [18 sider]

Arbeidskrav

Følgende arbeidskrav skal være godkjent i fjerde semesteret for at studenten kan fremstille seg til eksamen: Skriftlig gruppeoppgave i form av et etterretningsprodukt i henhold til nærmere føringer gitt av emneansvarlig. Produktet legges også frem som en muntlig presentasjon. Arbeidskravet vurderes til godkjent/ikke godkjent.

Eksamen

Vurdering og sensur

Vurderingsform: Essay

Tidspunkt: 4. semester

Varighet: 3 dager

Karakterskala: A-F

Vekt: 100 %

Kommentar til vurdering: Individuelt skriftlig essay på 2500 ord +/- 10 % som skrives hjemme.

Eventuelle tillatte hjelpemidler: Alle. Det forutsettes at arbeidet er et selvstendig arbeid.